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In this dissertation I quantify residential behavior response to interventions
designed to reduce electricity demand at different periods of the day.
In the first chapter, I examine the effect of information provision coupled
with bimonthly billing, monthly billing, and in-home displays, as well as a time-of-
use (TOU) pricing scheme to measure consumption over each month of the Irish
Consumer Behavior Trial. I find that time-of-use pricing with real time usage in-
formation reduces electricity usage up to 8.7 percent during peak times at the start
of the trial but the effect decays over the first three months and after three months
the in-home display group is indistinguishable from the monthly treatment group.
Monthly and bi-monthly billing treatments are not found to be statistically different
from another. These findings suggest that increasing billing reports to the monthly
level may be more cost effective for electricity generators who wish to decrease ex-
penses and consumption, rather than providing in-home displays.
In the following chapter, I examine the response of residential households af-
ter exposure to time of use tariffs at different hours of the day. I find that these
treatments reduce electricity consumption during peak hours by almost four per-
cent, significantly lowering demand. Within the model, I find evidence of overall
conservation in electricity used. In addition, weekday peak reductions appear to
carry over to the weekend when peak pricing is not present, suggesting changes in
consumer habit.
The final chapter of my dissertation imposes a system wide time of use plan to
analyze the potential reduction in carbon emissions from load shifting based on the
Ireland and Northern Single Electricity Market. I find that CO2 emissions savings
are highest during the winter months when load demand is highest and dirtier power
plants are scheduled to meet peak demand. TOU pricing allows for shifting in usage
from peak usage to off peak usage and this shift in load can be met with cleaner
and cheaper generated electricity from imports, high efficiency gas units, and hydro
units.
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In most countries, households use electricity and pay for it only at the end of
the billing cycle one or more months later. The disconnect between the time-of-use
(TOU) and the time of payment is sometimes blamed for the little awareness and/or
wastefulness that many consumers appear to have about their usage of electricity.
Real time information feedback combined with various pricing schemes has been
found to reduce residential energy consumption more than information and pricing
policies alone [22, 28, 31]. Within this manuscript, I present three chapters linked
by the commonality of how information and TOU pricing are utilized in in an effort
to curtail peak usage, as well the impact on environmental quality. Specifically, I
examine several research questions that explore the use of various forms of informa-
tion provision to encourage residential households to engage in energy conservation
and load shifting. First, in the context of information provision, I analyze the effect
of how increased frequency of information impact customer consumption patterns.
Then, I examine the potential changes in habit in response to TOU billing and
heterogeneity in such responses. Finally, I apply a hypothetical systemwide TOU
policy to analyze potential savings in generation and CO2 emissions.
In the first two chapters, I utilize a unique dataset from the Irish Consumer
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Behavior Trial to examine the effect of information provision on consumption. The
trial took place between 2009 and 2010 when Irish households that were previously
on a flat rate tariff and bi-monthly billing were invited to participate in a TOU trial.
Households selected to be in the treatment group receive their usage information in
bi-monthly billing, monthly billing, or in-home displays. Socio-demographic infor-
mation such as age, education, house type, homeownership, and employment was
collected through pre and post trial surveys.
In the first chapter, the main method of estimation is a panel fixed effects
model to estimate the information treatment effects with monthly interaction terms.
Results suggest that monthly and bi-monthly billing do not provide significantly
different results. I suspect that households with less educated and older residents
are more likely to drop out of the treatment group. To correct for possible self-
selection out of the trial, I apply fixed effects and a method called coarsened exact
matching where households in the treatment and control group are matched by
household characteristics such as age, education, and type of residence. Results
from robustness checks show similar results.
Second, I examine the response of residential households at different hours of
the day to the introduction of TOU tariffs. TOU pricing encourages households
to alter their electricity consumption patterns. Again, I apply a panel fixed effects
model to hourly observations to estimate the average hourly response to TOU pricing
for weekdays and weekends. Results are consistent with expectations: households
shift usage away from peak periods in order to consume electricity at a lesser tariff
rate. I posit that households with the highest demand would be most responsive to
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TOU treatment. Households in the lowest quantile of demand appear to increase
their overall consumption in response to TOU pricing. Since poor households tend
to have low electricity usage, an increase in the consumption on TOU pricing may
indicate an improvement in comfort.
In the final part of my dissertation, I impose a systemwide TOU plan to
analyze the potential reduction in carbon emissions from load shifting based on
the Ireland and Northern Ireland Single Electricity Market. I utilize generator unit
commercial and technical offer data to create daily merit curves representative of
the island electricity supply. I calculate the cost of generation and subsequent CO2
emissions from generation for actual load demand. I apply the same procedure to
a situation under which residential TOU pricing is imposed on the island based on
average treatment effect results from the previous chapter. Findings suggest that
TOU pricing during fall and winter months provide the largest emissions savings. I
do not find evidence of an increase in emissions that has been found with systems
that use hydro and oil units to meet peak load.
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Chapter 2: The Effectiveness of Information Provision with Time-of-
Use Pricing
2.1 Introduction
Feedback on electricity use has been found to be an effective mechanism in
improving supplier efficiency and encouraging the reduction of residential energy
consumption [28, 35]. One way these savings have been made possible through the
widespread installation of smart meters in the US and European countries such as
the UK, Italy, and France [30]. In this paper, a smart meter is defined as a device
that records a households incremental energy usage and transmits the information
to inform the utility of periods of high and low electricity demand in real time.1 The
consumer is able to access information about his/her real time electricity usage and
current tariff rate from an in-home display (IHD). This information can allow the
consumer to learn about how their energy habits impacts their overall usage and
1Darby (2006) defines meters with one-way customer to utility communication abilities to be
automated meter reading meters. These meters require additional technology, such as IHDs or
web applications, in order for consumers to receive real time information. The general literature
defines smart meters as devices that are capable of transmitting information two ways between the
utility and consumer [22].
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bill and encourage conservation practices.
Utilities often use energy efficiency and demand response programs, such as
time-of-use (TOU) pricing and dynamic pricing (e.g. real time pricing and critical
peak pricing (CPP)), to reduce electricity demand and shift peak usage. These
pricing schemes allow the price of electricity to reflect the cost of generation at
varying efficiency rates of fuel powered generation and fuel prices during times of
high and low demand [20, 30].2 The ideal result is a shifting of usage away from
periods of higher energy costs to periods of lower energy cost and reduce greenhouse
gas emissions when dirtier fuels or less efficient generation units are used to meet
peak demands [30]. Other benefits of dynamic and TOU pricing include reducing
peak congestion and susceptibility to outages by spreading out electricity demand to
other periods and allowing for more efficiently generated electricity to be distributed
to consumers [30,62].
Under TOU pricing schemes, prices are higher during times of peak demand
and lower during off peak periods. These price signals give consumers the incentive
to reduce or shift their usage away from peak hours in exchange for lower bills. TOU
pricing is commonly identified as a separate entity from dynamic pricing because
the rate structure is known in advance and does not vary with system demand in
an unpredictable fashion. This eliminates price uncertainty and enables customers
to alter their habits around peak periods.
Determining how TOU and feedback information are adapted into the house-
2If the baseload is fueled with a more carbon intensive fuel, such as coal or fuel oil, then shifting
peak load may result in an increase in CO2 emissions.
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hold and how households adjust their consumption over time would provide evidence
about the effectiveness of continuous information provision. Although several stud-
ies look at the impact of feedback on household energy savings with various pricing
strategies [26,51,68,78], how these feedback technologies compare with conventional
billing methods have yet to be explored. To determine whether these feedback tech-
nologies are cost-effective, it is necessary to assess if their effect is sustained over
time.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the change in usage with different methods
of information feedback coupled with a TOU pricing scheme. I use the Ireland
Behavior Trial data (Di Cosmo et al. 2014, Caroll et al. 2014). The Commission
of Energy Regulation conducted the trial in 2009-2010 to investigate the impact of
smart metering technology combined with TOU pricing and information stimuli on
consumer behavior during times of peak demand. I take advantage of this unique
panel with information about household electricity consumption to answer three
main questions on the effectiveness of an IHD compared to the conventional methods
of billing.
First, how persistent are the effects of information provision in a TOU setting?
One potential interpretation is that the increased stock of information treatment al-
lows households to learn about their usage patterns and adapt their usage around
peak periods to increase savings. This learning occurs through consumer experi-
mentation by altering daily habits such as turning off lights, unplugging electronic
devices, lowering the thermostat if the home uses electric heating, and waiting until
off peak times to start running appliances. Households can determine which actions
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impact their electricity bill the most and optimize their usage. Alternatively, the
treatment can act as a cue that reminds consumers to cut back on their usage, which
may persist for as long as the treatment is in place, or longer.
Second, how do households with IHDs compare in terms of peak energy savings
to those on monthly or bi-monthly billing in the beginning and the later months of
the trial? In other words, what is the benefit gained from additional information?
On average, a household with an IHD is expected to have a larger response than a
household with conventional billing as they have more complete information sets.
However, information provision has been found to affect households in a heteroge-
neous manner. While households are able to save on average, some increase their
usage with monitoring [68]. And, having the IHD doesnt mean that you necessarily
use it.
And third, what are the overall savings from households with IHDs compared
to conventional billing? This question is tied to the previous question in that house-
holds with more information are expected to make larger changes to their energy
use. Yet, it may be possible that households with extremely low usage may increase
their usage overall when provided with more information [35]. Given the structure
of TOU pricing, gains in reduced peak consumption may be offset by increases in off
peak consumption. This question addresses the overall energy conservation aspect
of information with TOU pricing.
Multiple studies have found that information with pricing policies reduce or
shift energy consumption by encouraging behavioral changes [16, 26, 31, 51–53, 78].
Other studies find time varying pricing to be more effective with critical peak pric-
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ing and load controls [79, 80]. In this paper, I find that households with IHDs on
a bi-monthly billing schedule reduce their peak energy consumption by a larger
percentage than households in the monthly and bi-monthly treatment groups dur-
ing the earlier months of the trial. However, the IHD reductions decline until the
effects are comparable to those of monthly billing. The fading of the effects sug-
gests that IHD reductions are not permanent but become less effective over time
as households become accustomed to the IHD. On the other hand, monthly and
bi-monthly treatment groups show gradual increase in reductions over the course of
the trial, suggesting a slower learning rate as households develop a new habit stock.
In terms of overall conservation I find that monthly billing is more cost effective
than providing IHDs with a 10-year lifespan.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a
discussion of relevant literatures, Section 3 discusses the background of the Irish
electricity market, Sections 4 and 5 discuss the trial design and provides a descrip-
tion of the data. Section 6 explains the models and provides an analysis of the
results. Section 7 provides a brief cost comparison and section 8 concludes.
2.2 Relevant Literature
Energy is infrequently on the mind of the typical consumer and increasing
information transparency in energy usage can nudge consumers to be more con-
scious of their consumption by encouraging the adoption of energy efficiency and
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conservation practices [14, 35, 39]. Providing households with information on their
usage may increase awareness of their energy consumption and enable learning and
experimentation with their energy usage to potentially increase energy savings by
7-12 percent [56]. Gans et al. (2013) shows that households on a prepaid plan re-
duce their average by 11 to 17 percent when given keypad technology meters that
displayed real time usage information. Similarly, Houde et al. (2013) finds that
households with access to direct feedback through a Google operated web applica-
tion had an average reduction of 5.7 percent in energy usage in the mornings and
the evenings.
In addition, the combination of information with pricing policies is more likely
to encourage further reduction in usage since feedback may become less effective
when it becomes more difficult for households to reduce their consumption after a
certain point without additional incentives [9, 40, 54]. Addressing the behavior of
consumers to change their energy usage may play a larger role in the success of an
IHD than environmental awareness alone [37].
Past literature has studied the effects of information provision and found that
information and pricing policies alone result in lower energy savings than what is
found in studies that combined information and dynamic pricing schemes [22,28,31].
Jessoe and Rapson (2013) find households on CPP combined with IHDs were able to
consistently reduce their consumption by 10 percentage points more than households
with CPP only. Similarly, Ivanov et al. (2013) find that households with smart
meters and smart thermostats use 15 percent less energy than those without enabling
technologies on critical peak days. Ito et al. (2013) analyze a trial in Japan where
9
every household receives an IHD and find the impact of critical peak pricing to
be more effective than social pressure, suggesting pricing policies provide further
incentive than conservation alerts.
TOU pricing in conjunction with information has been found to result in the
shift of usage around peak times. Torriti (2012) compares electricity consumption
one year before and one year after the introduction of TOU tariffs and finds that
households shift their usage during peak hours to the hours directly prior and after
the peak period, demonstrating consumers ability to change their habits by starting
their appliances at earlier or later times. His overall findings suggest an increase in
usage by 13.69 percent but billing amounts decreased by 2.21 percent, questioning
the effectiveness of IHDs with TOU pricing. This study, however, did not include a
control group to account for trends that may confound the estimation.
Other studies that have utilized the Ireland Consumer Behavior Trial data used
in this paper have found IHDs to effectively reduce consumption during peak period
under a TOU policy. Di Cosmo et al. (2014) estimate a difference-in-differences
(DID) random effects panel regression to determine presence of a linear relationship
between the size of the TOU tariff applied and the reduction in electricity consumed.
They find households installed with IHDS exhibit a weak price response associated
with the applied TOU during peak hours. Alternatively, households on monthly and
bi-monthly billing are associated with nonlinear responses to changes in TOU tariff,
consistent with non-linear reactions observed in Reiss and White (2005) and Woo et
al. (2013b).3 Caroll et al. (2014) aggregates pretrial and testing period consumption
3Woo et al. (2013b) also estimates the elasticity of substitution from peak to off peak usage
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to two observations per household to estimate a DID fixed effects model. They find
peak reductions of 9.4 percent for households with IHDs, 8.7 percent for households
on monthly billing, and 5.4 percent for households on bi-monthly but do not find
evidence that increasing information provision to have an effect on reducing peak
consumption.
I study the persistence of energy savings of different information feedback to
determine if more information is cost effective. I find a gradual increase in savings
from conventional billing methods and a dramatic decrease in IHD treatment effects
after three months of the trial. Ultimately, I test the difference between treatments
and find the effects are not significantly different from another in the latter parts of
the trial.
These findings regarding consumer learning from information and conventional
billing methods are similar to studies in other areas of research that find evidence
of consumers learning from bills. For example, participants who fill out overdraft
surveys are less likely to incur overdraft fees [10, 71]. Another study analyzed par-
ticipants switching calling plans to minimize cost of service [59]. Narayanan et al.
(2007) find consumers on fixed telephone plans learn slower than consumers on vari-
able plans as the latter provided more information on their usage. Some studies
have found that treatments like this require persistence in information provision.
Houde et al. (2013) finds the effects in their trial begin to fade by the fourth week
to be less than 0.07 for TOU pricing without information. This estimate indicates a low response
compared to estimates in Baladi et al. (1998) who find the elasticity of substitution to be 0.14 for
a typical home, 0.39 for all electric homes, and -0.006 for homes without major electric appliances.
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after their trial terminated. Behavior formed over a three-month period is likely to
persist but only with continued feedback [22].4
In this paper, the treatment group provided with real time information is
associated with high reductions in usage but decays as the trial advances. This
suggests that effectiveness of information wanes when households get used to the
presence of the display. Examples of this can be found in other facets of consumer
research. Richins and Bloch (1991) find that car owner involvement with their vehi-
cle diminishes as they grow accustomed to their purchase. After the initial novelty
of their purchase subsides, consumers dont spend much time thinking, learning, or
talking about the product on a day-to-day basis [65] . Similarly, the shock of the
home energy reports and bills aimed to generate an immediate response in energy
reduction have been found to decay over the days following the report arrival [8,38].
Evidence of reduced effectiveness of signals can also be found in medicine where the
effectiveness of mailed appointment reminders seemed to decrease with time [60].
2.3 Background
2.3.1 Residential Electricity Consumption in the Republic of Ireland
Home heating consists of a significant proportion of energy consumed in res-
idential homes in the Republic of Ireland, where 67 percent of residential energy
consumed goes towards space heating and 16 percent to water heating [72]. The
4The Houde et al. (2013) trial spans a period of three months, March through May 2010.
12
late development of a natural gas network makes fuel oil their main source of energy
followed by electricity and natural gas. Fuel oil (40.6 percent in 2010) and natural
gas (38.6 percent) are the fuels predominantly used for residential space heating;
electricity constitutes a mere 4.8 percent. Government programs have aimed to
reduce energy usage and CO2 emissions by providing incentives for households to
adopt energy efficient measures.5
Since Ireland is a country that does not rely on electricity for heating and
cooling, energy savings must come from other end uses. In 2011, the major end use
of electricity is hot water heating with electric immersion (25 percent), followed by
small appliances such as computers and televisions (19 percent). Lighting constitutes
as 16 percent of electricity usage, washers and dryers 11 percent, and refrigeration
10 percent [72]. The rest goes towards cooking, fans, and space heating. Shifting
of usage can come from waiting until the off peak period to use hot water, run the
washers and dryers. Turning off lights and small appliances when not in use can
result in overall electricity savings. Savings can also occur through efficiency gains
when households replace old appliances with more efficient ones (e.g. a new clothes
washer uses 70 percent less energy [63].
5Some recent programs include the Home Energy Saving Scheme, which started in 2008 and
was integrated into the Better Energy Homes Scheme in 2011. The Better Energy Homes Scheme
provided grants totaling up to 160 million Euros and saved 47 million Euros on energy costs [72].
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2.3.2 Electric Ireland, Meter Readings, and Smart Meters
The full deregulation of the electricity market in 2005 allowed electricity cus-
tomers across Ireland to choose their suppliers. Prior to this, the state-owned com-
pany Electric Ireland supplied all domestic electricity. Around the time of the Ire-
land smart meter rollouts in 2008, Electric Ireland continued to supply electricity to
100 percent of the market in Ireland. The company conducted meter readings four
times a year and required a meter reader to be physically present at the home to
record the meter reading. If the reader was unable to get a reading then the utility
used an estimate until the next reading occurred and adjusted the bill accordingly.
Customers received their electric bills every two months that included the meter
reading and the tariff applied to the bill [2].
The conventional method of meter reading is more prone to errors in supplier
services and billing caused by inaccurate readings from human error or estimation
errors if a current reading is not possible. Properly functioning smart meters elim-
inate these errors by providing accurate and real time readings in 15 minute to
hourly intervals. In this trial, smart meters record the households usage at half
hourly intervals and transmit this information to the supplier and households with
IHDs.6
6Smart meter installation does not automatically imply that consumers are given feedback.
Recorded usage information is generally provided to the supplier and an additional display unit is
required for households to gain access to the smart meter information.
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Figure 2.1: Trial Timeline
2.4 Trial
The Commission of Energy Regulation conducted the Irish Consumer Behav-
ior Trial as part of the National Smart Metering Plan in the Republic of Ireland.
The trial took place from 2009-2010 to investigate the impact of smart metering
technology combined with TOU tariffs and feedback stimuli on consumer behavior
on reductions in peak demand and overall electricity use [20].
Figure 2.1 outlines the timeline of the trial:
• Pre-Benchmark period (Mar 2008-June 2009): Recruitment of participants oc-
curred in four waves where subsequent waves are adjusted to ensure a nation-
ally representative sample. An additional non-recruitment survey is conducted
to ensure that those who did not participate in the trial were not significantly
different from those who were. During this period, smart meters are installed
in participating homes.
• Benchmark period (July-Dec 2009): Baseline data are collected prior to the
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start of the test period and the billing period post is adjusted to the calendar
month. Consumers receive bi-monthly electric bills. The pre-trial survey is
also conducted and participants are randomly assigned to control and treat-
ment groups. The treatment group receives the first half of their balancing
credit.7
• Testing period (Jan-Dec 2010): The control group continues to be billed at
their existing flat rate (14.1 cents per kWh) and receive a bi-monthly electric
bill whereas the treatment groups have different TOU tariffs and feedback
stimuli.
• Post trial survey (Jan-Feb 2011): Participants return to their normal billing
cycle and flat rate tariffs on January 1, 2011. The post trial survey is con-
ducted via telephone during this period. The treatment group receives the
second half of their balancing credit.
7Prior to the start of the trial, households were also guaranteed a balancing credit to ensure
they do not incur more costs than if they were on the regular tariff. The credits were distributed in
December 2009 and January 2011 to avoid any unintended effects to household consumption during
the trial. See Tables A.1 and A.2 in Appendix A for details about households that received the
credit. Approximately 41 percent of households in the treatment group received balancing credits.
A larger proportion of the bi-monthly group received balancing credits, followed by the monthly
group. This means that households on the trial not on the IHD were not reducing/redirecting
their usage enough to avoid paying more than if they were on the flat tariff. They therefore had
to be compensated.
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Treatment Night Day1 Peak Day2 Flat Rate
11pm-7:59am 8am-4:59pm 5pm-6:59pm 7pm-10:59pm
Tariff A 12 14 20 14
Tariff B 11 13.5 26 13.5
Tariff C 10 13 32 13
Tariff D 9 12.5 38 12.5
Control 14.1
Table 2.1: Weekday TOU Pricing Schedule (Euro cents per kWh excluding VAT)
At the time of assignment to treatment, the trial had 5,027 participants who
volunteered to participate in the trial, of which 1,170 were randomly assigned to the
control group. Records were deleted from the study for participants who withdrew
from the trial. Of the original sample, 2,407 remain in the treatment group and 928
in the control group for the study.8
Participants in the Residential group are randomly assigned two treatments.
The first treatment is the TOU tariff where each household is assigned to one of four
TOU pricing structures in Table 2.1. The TOU day is divided into the following
periods: peak period from 5pm-6:59pm on weekdays, day periods are between 8am-
4:59pm and 7pm-10:59pm on weekdays and 8am-10:59pm on weekends and holidays
(the peak period is excluded from weekends and holidays), and the night period (off
peak hours) are the hours between 11pm-7:59am. The prices of electricity during
these hours are structured with the peak having the highest tariff when demand for
8Participants were assigned to two TOU tariff groups, a Residential Tariff and a Weekend Tariff.
Participants from the Weekend tariff are omitted from this study (100 households) as they face a
different pricing structure from the Residential Tariff group. An additional information treatment
group also omitted from the study (939 households).
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Treatment Description
BM Bi-monthly billing + energy report
M Monthly billing + energy report
IHD In-home display + bi-monthly billing + energy report
Control Bi-monthly billing
Table 2.2: Information Treatment
BM M IHD Control Total
Tariff A 281 290 293 - 864
Tariff B 108 111 114 - 333
Tariff C 299 295 291 - 885
Tariff D 109 114 103 - 325
Control - - - 928 928
Total 796 810 801 928 3,335
Table 2.3: Treatment Assignment
electricity is highest and off peak having the lowest tariff when demand is lowest.
Tariff A has the highest nighttime rate but has the lowest peak rate. Tariff D, on
the other hand, has the lowest nighttime rate and the highest peak rate.
The second treatment assigns each household one of three feedback groups
that provide varying degrees of feedback on information about their energy usage,
as shown in Table 2.2.9 All three information feedback groups receive a billing state-
ment combined with an energy usage statement providing details on their household
electricity usage along with tips on how to reduce energy use. The first group re-
ceives bi-monthly (BM) electricity bills with the first bill arriving in March. The
second group receives bills on a more frequent monthly (M) basis. The last group
has an IHD (IHD) in addition to receiving a bi-monthly bill. The IHD relays real
9A fourth information stimulus included a bi-monthly bill with an Overall Load Reduction
incentive of 20 Euros if households are able to reach a 10 percent reduction target over a period of
8 months. This group had a later start date than the other treatments and is excluded from the
analysis.
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time information, which is information updated at 30-minute intervals to the par-
ticipants that includes the households electricity usage, associated cost of electricity
consumed, and current price of electricity.10 Appendix A provides information about
the in-home display and shows a picture of one. A budget setting mechanism is also
included into the monitor to allow households to decide their maximum spending
on electricity per day. Table 2.3 shows the distribution of the TOU tariff and infor-
mation treatment assignments.
Participants completed pre- and post-trial surveys that gathered socio-demographic
data about the respondent and household. Questions include respondents age, gen-
der, employment, income bracket, size of the home, number of people residing in
the home, and types of fuel used for heating and cooking. A majority of the ques-
tions in the second half of the survey assess usage behavior during the trial. The
post-trial survey gathered information on respondents perception of the impact of
the trial, tariffs and method of information feedback. The survey also asks after the
ownership and replacement of appliances and if participation in the trial resulted
in more energy efficient investments. Attitudes towards energy reduction were also
included in the survey.
10The post trial survey did not inquire about the frequency of interaction with the IHD. Of
the 622 IHD respondents that completed the follow up survey, 49.36 percent regularly and 22.35
percent occasionally continued to consult their display. Households that stopped using the display
felt they had already learned as much as they could or didnt find the display useful (36.93 percent)
while others claimed their display had stopped working (37.50 percent).
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Treatment Control T-C p-value T obs C obs
Electricity Consumption
Daily baseline mean (kWh) 12.08 (1.79) 11.46 (1.73) 0.62 (0.22) 0.01 123 123
Day1 baseline mean (kWh) 0.51 (0.07) 0.49 (0.07) 0.02 (0.01) 0.01 119 119
Peak baseline mean (kWh) 0.85 (0.20) 0.80 (0.18) 0.05 (0.02) 0.03 119 119
Day2 baseline mean (kWh) 0.78 (0.13) 0.74 (0.12) 0.04 (0.02) 0.02 119 119
Night baseline mean (kWh) 0.29 (0.02) 0.27 (0.02) 0.02 (0.00) 0.00 119 119
Demographics
No. of residents 3.07 (2.21) 2.86 (2.20) 0.21 (0.09) 0.02 2731 768
No. of residents (> 15 years) 2.53 (0.98) 2.47 (0.93) 0.06 (0.04) 0.18 2232 596
No. of residents (< 15 years) 1.89 (0.93) 1.90 (0.97) 0.02 (0.08) 0.85 832 186
Age of respondent 18-35 (%) 11.00 (0.31) 9.46 (0.29) 10.66 (0.01) 0.21 2718 761
Age of respondent 36-55 (%) 46.98 (0.50) 41.79 (0.50) 5.20 (0.02) 0.01 2718 761
No formal education (%) 1.36 (0.12) 1.64 (0.13) 1.42 (0.01) 0.58 2582 731
Primary education (%) 10.88 (0.31) 15.32 (0.36) 4.44 (0.01) 0.00 2582 731
Secondary education (%) 47.13 (0.50) 47.61 (0.50) 0.47 (0.02) 0.82 2582 731
Third level education (%) 40.63 (0.49) 35.43 (0.48) 5.20 (0.02) 0.01 2582 731
Employed (%) 52.07 (0.49) 53.91 (0.50) 8.16 (0.02) 0.00 2731 768
Unemployed (%) 8.79 (0.28) 7.29 (0.26) 1.50 (0.01) 0.17 2731 768
Retired/caretaker (%) 29.15 (0.45) 38.80 (0.48) 9.66 (0.02) 0.00 2731 768
Housing Characteristics
Homeowner (%) 92.99 (0.25) 93.34 (0.25) 0.36 (0.01) 0.73 2723 766
No. of bedrooms 3.47 (0.83) 3.42 (0.87) 0.05 (0.04) 0.16 2726 766
Apartment (%) 1.65 (0.13) 1.96 (0.14) 0.31 (0.01) 0.58 2726 766
Semi-detached home (%) 33.42 (0.47) 29.11 (0.45) 4.31 (0.02) 0.02 2726 766
Detached home/bungalow (%) 50.33 (0.50) 54.44 (0.50) 4.11 (0.02) 0.04 2726 766
Terraced home (%) 14.60 (0.35) 14.49 (0.35) 0.11 (0.01) 0.94 2726 766
No. of appliancesa 6.09 (1.90) 6.01 (1.91) 0.09 (0.08) 0.27 2731 768
No. of electronicsb 4.08 (2.30) 3.72 (2.23) 0.36 (0.09) 0.00 2731 768
Electric space heatingc (%) 6.88 (0.25) 7.68 (0.27) 0.80 (0.01) 0.46 2731 768
Electric water heatingd (%) 62.36 (0.48) 61.85 (0.49 0.51 (0.02) 0.80 2731 768
Note: aAppliances, include dryers, washers, dishwashers, electric cookers, freezers, and water pops
top, are coded at 3; bElectronics, include televisions, computers, laptop, and game consoles, are
top coded at 4; cElectric heating includes central heating, storage heating, and plug-in heaters;
dElectric water heating includes central, immersion, or instantaneous water heater.
Table 2.4: Summary Statistics of Treatment and Control Groups
2.5 The Data
The electricity consumption data, collected in half hour intervals from July
14, 2009 to December 31, 2010, are used extensively in this analysis. I aggregate
usage observations to the daily totals for each period. The Commission for Energy
Regulation in the Republic of Ireland reports that the average household uses 5,067
kWh of electricity in 2009 [72]. The average daily consumption of the households in
the sample ranges from 11.67-12.26 kWh (11.46-12.08 kWh on weekdays) from July
to December of 2009 (see Table 2.45), an estimated average of 4,258-4,475 kWh in
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2009.
The temperature in Fahrenheit is an average of the average daily temperature
from four weather monitoring stations located in four of Ireland’s airports: Cork,
Dublin, Galway, and Shannon. Since the temperature correlations between the sta-
tions are high (correlation coefficients of 0.963-0.980), I average the observations
from each station. I use these 24-hour temperature averages to calculate the daily
heating degree-day. The year 2009 had average annual heating degree-days (HDD)
of 5794.85, and this was slightly warmer than that of 2010, which had an average
of 6414.95 heating degree-days. Annual cooling degree-days are 0.625 for 2009 and
0 for 201011. The trial period (July 14, 2009 to December 31, 2010) did not witness
average daily temperatures over 65◦ F. Daylight hours are also available with an
annual average of 4486.19 hours of daylight for both years.
2.5.1 Is there self-selection into the sample?
One concern with any analysis is that households voluntarily participated in
the study, and therefore estimates may be biased. In theory, random assignment
to treatment and control groups should render both groups to have insignificant
differences. One possible explanation as to why they are different could be that
households with older or less educated residents assigned to the treatment group
may have found the treatment difficult to understand or adopt, resulting in their
11The milder and rainy weather in Ireland is similar to that of the state of Washington (2009:
HDD= 6651.40, CDD=185.59; 2010: HDD=6448.16, CDD=91.38)
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withdrawal from the trial.12
I estimate a probit model as an indirect way to check for selection into the
sample. This is to ensure there are no significant differences between the treatment
and control groups. In the model, the dependent variable takes on a value of one
if household i is assigned to the treatment group and 0 if otherwise. This variable
is then regressed on household and building characteristics with results shown in
Table 2.5. A test of joint significance for the explanatory variables rejects the
null hypothesis at the 5 percent level13, Chi2(18)= 34.93, p=0.010. The t-tests for
each coefficient show that there are also a few variables that are significant and
this is consistent with Table 2.4 that compares the difference in means between
the treatment and control group. I find statistically significant differences in the
mean of the variables for baseline usage, number of residents, number of electronics,
employment status, age, education level, and type of home.
These baseline differences should be accounted for using fixed effects estima-
tion with individual household fixed effects. Additionally, a Wald test on coarsened
exact matching (CEM)14 estimates in Table 2.5 fails to reject the null hypothesis at
12The aging studies literature has often found evidence of a digital divide in that older adults
are less likely to be involved in high level use, culture, and pleasures of using information and
communication technology [67].
13Di Cosmo et al. (2014) perform a similar test on the same data, but found no significance at
the 5 percent level. The difference here is that I use a more exhaustive set of explanatory variables
in this regression model.
14Coarsened exact matching improves the estimation of casual effects by reducing the imbalance
in covariates between treatment and control groups by matching observations similar in covariates
between the treatment and control group and trimming observations that fail to match [49]. Further
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Treatment All (S.E.) CEM (S.E.)
Average daily usage in 2009 1.99E-04 (0.003) 9.67E-04 (0.003)
No. of residents -0.001 (0.015) -0.041** (0.020)
Age 18-35D -0.122 (0.110) -0.208 (0.145)
Age 36-55D -0.113 (0.078) -0.043 (0.103)
No formal educationD -0.072 (0.223) -0.190 (0.328)
Primary educationD -0.203** (0.092) -0.345** (0.115)
Secondary educationD -0.028 (0.059) -0.058 (0.071)
EmployedD 0.288*** (0.080) 0.115 (0.101)
UnemployedD 0.254** (0.115) -0.050 (0.182)
HomeownerD 0.019 (0.118) 0.059 (0.162)
No. of bedrooms 0.032 (0.040) 0.051 (0.046)
ApartmentD -0.173 (0.213) -0.106 (0.331)
Semi-detached houseD -0.028 (0.087) 0.087 (0.110)
Detached houseD -0.079 (0.085) 0.083 (0.108)
No. of appliances -0.006 (0.016) 0.006 (0.019)
No. of electronics 0.024 (0.015) -0.008 (0.021)
Electric space heatingD -0.051 (0.102) 0.041 (0.114)
Electric water heatingD 0.020 (0.056) 0.004 (0.065)
Constant 0.394 (0.177) 0.251 (0.263)
Observations 2,589 1,830
Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Note: The first probit model includes all households in the treatment and control
groups that completed the survey. The second probit model includes household in
the treatment and control groups trimmed with coarsened exact matching.
Table 2.5: Probit Results
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the 5 percent level (Chi2(18)= 23.93, p=0.157), suggesting there are no significant
differences between the two groups after CEM is applied.
2.6 The Models
The aim of this paper is to estimate the effect of information provision and
adaptation on usage throughout the trial. The half hourly usage data is aggregated
to the period level per day for each household in the treatment control groups. There
are four observations per day representing “before peak” (8am to 4:59pm), “peak”
(5pm to 6:59pm), “after peak” (7pm to 10:59pm), and “night” (11pm to 7:59am)
period usage. Figure 1a compares the average daily peak usage in the treatment
and control groups. While immediate reductions in energy usage are evident from
the IHD treatment group, the effects gradually dissipate down to the level similar
to billing-only households. This phenomenon suggests that the effectiveness of the
IHD wanes over time and blends into the background of a households routine.
I estimate the following model for the combination of three information treat-
ments and four periods of the day:





βn,t([Monthm]n × [TREATiy]t) + εidmyw
(2.1)
where Yidmyw is the natural log of household is daily electricity usage in kWh for
period p of each weekday w, day d in month m of year y. The vector of treatment
emphasis of this method is explained in section 5.1.
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dummies, TREATiy, take a value of 0 for the control group and all observations
during the benchmark period, and a value of 1 for households in either the IHD,
monthly, and bi-monthly information treatment groups after the trial begins. It is
interacted with a vector of monthly dummies, indicated by Monthm, for each month
of the testing period.
I control for a vector of seasonal variables Sdmy including an indicator for a
bank holiday, the natural log of heating degree-days and daylight hours. Day of
the week fixed effects, denoted by ρw, and month by year fixed effects, denoted by
φmy, control for variations in usage due to changes in the work day and season,
respectively. Observations where residents of the household are probably away from
home (their daily usage is below 0.1 kWh for 12 consecutive days or more) are
dropped from the analysis. Residents that are away for long periods of time may
bias estimates if they are not present to react to changes in price. Additionally,
I restrict my observations to weekday usage as weekends are on a different tariff
schedule and do not have peak periods. I estimate Equation 2.1 separately for each
period of the day: day1, peak, day2, and night for a total of 4 regressions.
The coefficients βI,n are the average treatment effects by treatment, period,
and month of the trial. Standard errors are clustered two ways at the household
and day of the trial level as household is errors may be correlated at the household
and day level. Finally, εidmyw is an unobserved error term. The fixed effects model
is estimated using the within estimation approach, which allows for a more flexi-
ble model, exploiting the variation over time within each household. I perform a
Hausman test and reject the null hypothesis suggesting effects are correlated with
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the covariates and that the fixed-effects model is appropriate, Chi2(32)= 1.6e+06
(p=0.000).
Since the main approach is a difference-in-differences estimation, it must meet
the assumption of parallel trends. A pre-treatment trends check between the treat-
ment and control groups to determine whether there are significant differences in
trends between the two groups is done for the benchmark period (model not shown).
I dont find evidence of different trends between the groups before the treatment pe-
riod, F169,3419 = 0.99, p=0.53. I then estimate the following specifications to test for
robustness of results. The first estimates Equation 2.1 using hourly observations,
doubling the observations for the peak period. The third specification introduces
day of the trial fixed effects t, which lends to a more flexible model. This specifi-
cation is more flexible and excludes the variables HDD, daylight, and holiday since
they are controlled for with day of the trial fixed effects.
Finally, I correct for the differences in the control and treatment groups. In
Figure 2.2(a), the control group energy consumption remains below the consump-
tion of the treatment groups throughout the benchmark period. While the design
of the trial is a randomized control, a participants decision to withdraw from his
participation may be correlated to his assigned treatment. One possible explana-
tion is that older or less educated participants may find the TOU structure to be
difficult to understand and withdraw from the trial resulting in an overestimation
of the effects.
I apply coarsened exact matching (CEM) (see Iacus et al. (2011)) to trim
the sample in order to achieve a better balance of the covariates between the treat-
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(a) Average daily peak electricity consumption for the treatment and control groups
(b) Average Daily Peak Electricity Consumption for Treatment and Control Groups with Coars-
ened Exact Matching
Figure 2.2: Average Daily Peak Electricity Consumption for Treatment and Control
Groups
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ment and control groups. I match households on variables that were found to be
significantly different across the control and treatment groups in Section 5.1: age,
education, employment status, type of house, number of electronics, and number
of residents. The control and treatment households are assigned to one of s strata
based on these characteristics. Households in the control group placed in the same
stratum as treatment units serve as matched controls for the latter. Weights are as-
signed to each household. Households in the treatment group are assigned a weight







mC and mT are the number of households in the control and treatment groups,
respectively, and msC and m
s
T are the number of matched control and treatment
households in strata s, respectively. Unmatched households are assigned a weight
of 0. Figure 2.2(b) shows the daily peak electricity consumption with CEM and the
baseline consumption of the control and treatment groups to be closely matched
prior to January 1, 2010.
I further aim to understand the impact of learning and the effect of informa-
tion with TOU pricing on overall daily consumption. Carroll et al. (2014) estimates
a similar DID fixed effects model to compare reduction in overall usage between
pre trial and testing period and finds the largest reductions coming from monthly
billing by 2.9 percent. However, household usages are aggregated to a total of two
observations per household, one before the trial and one during, and ignore seasonal
variation. By contrast, I estimate the daily average treatment effect for each month
of the trial using a similar specification to Equation 2.1. Additionally, I estimate a
single average treatment effect for the trial and a specification including only obser-
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vations during the trial with corresponding baseline usage, that is observations from
July 14 to December 31 of 2009 and 2010, to identify whether increasing information
through reports and IHDs encourages conservation in the form of reduced overall
energy usage.
I estimate the following:
Yidmyw = αi + ρw + φmy + γSdmy + β1BMimy + β2Mimy + β3IHDimy + εidmyw (2.2)
where BMimy, Mimy, IHDimy take a value of 1 for households in a bi-monthly,
monthly, or IHD treatment group, respectively, during the testing period and 0 oth-
erwise. In this case, the betas are the daily average treatment effects for information
treatments. Observations are aggregated at the daily level and standard errors are
clustered at the household level. I repeat this analysis with a sample that applies
CEM with weights as a robustness check.
2.7 Results and Analysis
Table 2.6 presents the estimates of Equation (1) for the peak, day1, day2, and
night periods from using the full sample period from July 14, 2009 to December 31,
2010. Within the table are three Columns for the bi-monthly bill and energy report
(BM), monthly bill and energy report (M), and IHDs with a bi-monthly bill and
energy report (IHD). Separate regressions are run for each information treatment
and compared to the control for the four periods of the day.
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Day1(8am-4:59pm) Peak (5pm-6:59pm) Day2 (7pm-10:59pm) Night (11pm-7:59am)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bi-monthly Billing
January -0.018 (0.011) -0.039*** (0.009) -0.005 (0.010) 0.012 (0.011)
February -0.004 (0.011) -0.022*** (0.008) 0.009 (0.010) 0.014 (0.010)
March 0.014 (0.010) -0.030*** (0.008) 0.009 (0.009) 0.025*** (0.009)
April 0.006 (0.010) -0.036*** (0.008) -0.004 (0.009) 0.022*** (0.008)
May -0.014 (0.010) -0.046*** (0.008) -0.008 (0.009) 0.013 (0.008)
June -0.006 (0.011) -0.043*** (0.008) -0.008 (0.010) 0.017** (0.009)
July -0.017 (0.012) -0.043*** (0.009) -0.016 (0.010) 0.018* (0.009)
August -0.023** (0.012) -0.047*** (0.009) -0.017* (0.010) 0.018* (0.009)
September -0.015 (0.011) -0.048*** (0.009) -0.009 (0.010) 0.020** (0.009)
October -0.017 (0.011) -0.044*** (0.009) -0.004 (0.010) 0.020** (0.009)
November -0.009 (0.012) -0.046*** (0.010) -0.012 (0.010) 0.025** (0.011)
December -0.003 (0.015) -0.023** (0.010) -0.003 (0.012) 0.018 (0.014)
Monthly Billing
January -0.027** (0.011) -0.045*** (0.009) -0.014 (0.010) -0.013 (0.011)
February -0.019 (0.012) -0.031*** (0.009) 0.003 (0.010) 0.002 (0.010)
March -0.003 (0.011) -0.037*** (0.008) 0.001 (0.009) 0.011 (0.009)
April -0.022** (0.010) -0.045*** (0.008) -0.013 (0.009) 0.008 (0.008)
May -0.024** (0.010) -0.048*** (0.008) -0.009 (0.009) 0.010 (0.008)
June -0.017 (0.011) -0.047*** (0.008) -0.007 (0.010) 0.013 (0.009)
July -0.024** (0.012) -0.054*** (0.009) -0.015 (0.010) 0.018* (0.010)
August -0.030*** (0.011) -0.054*** (0.009) -0.019* (0.010) 0.013 (0.009)
September -0.027** (0.012) -0.056*** (0.008) -0.007 (0.010) 0.016* (0.010)
October -0.035*** (0.011) -0.052*** (0.009) -0.009 (0.010) 0.013 (0.009)
November -0.026** (0.012) -0.054*** (0.009) -0.010 (0.010) 0.016 (0.011)
December -0.025* (0.014) -0.043*** (0.010) -0.011 (0.012) -0.011 (0.014)
IHD + Bi-monthly Billing
January -0.053*** (0.011) -0.093*** (0.009) -0.045*** (0.010) -0.011 (0.011)
February -0.038*** (0.012) -0.071*** (0.009) -0.026*** (0.009) 0.004 (0.010)
March -0.020* (0.010) -0.058*** (0.008) -0.014 (0.009) 0.008 (0.009)
April -0.016* (0.009) -0.049*** (0.008) -0.015* (0.008) 0.014* (0.008)
May -0.025*** (0.010) -0.053*** (0.008) -0.013 (0.009) 0.019** (0.008)
June -0.015 (0.011) -0.053*** (0.008) -0.014 (0.010) 0.017** (0.009)
July -0.014 (0.011) -0.051*** (0.009) -0.010 (0.010) 0.015 (0.009)
August -0.016 (0.011) -0.060*** (0.009) -0.010 (0.009) 0.022** (0.009)
September -0.017* (0.010) -0.070*** (0.008) -0.010 (0.009) 0.020** (0.009)
October -0.012 (0.011) -0.053*** (0.008) -0.000 (0.009) 0.025*** (0.009)
November -0.017 (0.012) -0.064*** (0.010) -0.012 (0.010) 0.023** (0.010)
December -0.026* (0.014) -0.055*** (0.010) -0.022* (0.011) -0.002 (0.014)
Weekday fixed yes yes yes yes
Month×year yes yes yes yes
Heating degree days S(+) S(+) S(+) S(+)
Holiday S(+) NS S(-) NS
Daylight hours S(-) S(-) S(-) S(-)
Households 3,334 3,334 3,334 3,334
Observations 1,278,568 1,278,568 1,278,568 1,278,568
Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Table 2.6: Average Monthly Information Treatment Effects by Period of the Day
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2.7.1 Peak hours
The daily average treatment effects of the TOU pricing and information treat-
ment during the peak periods for each month of the year are reported in Table 2.6,
Columns 4-6. Households on TOU pricing and receiving a bi-monthly bill reduce
their peak usage by 2.22 and 4.92 percent per day. More frequent arrival of bills
(with monthly frequency) indicates an average reduction of 3.05 and 5.45 percent in
kilowatt-hours per day. IHD households reduce their daily consumption on average
by 4.78 and 8.88 percent. These effects are significant for all information treatments.
From these results, it would seem that the households provided with more
information about their consumption attain proportionally larger reductions in con-
sumption. Energy bills and reports may act as reminders for households to be more
aware of their usage and conserve energy. The more frequent the arrival of bills and
reports, the more often is a household’s usage brought to their attention. With bi-
monthly bills, there is a longer period in between the arrival of bills and households
slide back into their old habits as their efforts to reduce usage decline. This finding
is consistent with the study by Allcott and Rogers (2014) who finds attenuation
in the reduction of energy usage directly following a conservation report as more
reports are delivered.
Households receiving bi-monthly and monthly bills show a steadily increasing
reduction of peak usage throughout the trial. The average treatment effect for
households with IHDs starts out with the highest reduction of 8.88 percent but
gradually declines to effects close to that of the households under monthly billing
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(1) (2) (3)
H0 : βM = βBM H0 : βIHD = βBM H0 : βIHD = βM
F1,3333 Prob>F F1,3333 Prob>F F1,3333 Prob>F
January 0.44 0.5078 36.57 0.0000 29.89 0.0000
February 1.00 0.3173 29.49 0.0000 17.08 0.0000
March 0.79 0.3746 11.36 0.0008 6.27 0.0123
April 1.13 0.2870 2.77 0.0958 0.21 0.6477
May 0.10 0.7549 0.69 0.4062 0.30 0.5808
June 0.25 0.6200 1.25 0.2641 0.38 0.5371
July 1.48 0.2245 0.76 0.3823 0.12 0.7336
August 0.53 0.4654 1.96 0.1620 0.46 0.4963
September 0.73 0.3944 5.50 0.0190 2.27 0.1315
October 0.80 0.3708 1.19 0.2763 0.04 0.8453
November 0.67 0.4141 3.30 0.0691 1.04 0.3089
December 3.41 0.0647 9.09 0.0026 1.36 0.2439
Note: Joint F test for significant difference between information treatment effects
for individual months of the year for H0 : β̂M = β̂BM , H0 : β̂IHD = β̂BM , and H0 :
β̂IHD = β̂M , respectively. Column 1 compares monthly and bi-monthly treatment
effects, Column 2 compares IHD with bi-monthly treatment effects, and Column 3
compares IHD and monthly treatment effects. Significant differences at the 5% level
indicated in bold.
Table 2.7: Peak Period Information Treatment Joint F Tests of Significance
within three months. This suggests that IHDs enable faster learning but the initial
advantage of real time information dissipates as households reach a steady state.
After that point, monthly bills are as effective as IHDs. The finding that IHDs
become less effective in reducing energy usage over time is consistent with Hargreaves
et al. (2013) who suggest that IHDs gradually become “backgrounded,” that is,
blended into the background of household routines.
Table 2.7 shows results from comparison of treatments from Equation 2.1. Col-
umn 1 shows that increasing the frequency of bills from bi-monthly to the monthly
level does not significantly influence the peak consumption. A test of joint signif-
icance for the monthly treatment coefficients fails to reject the null hypothesis at
the 5 percent level (F12,3419 = 0.54, p=0.8884). On the other hand, IHD access
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decreases usage during peak hours by 2.08 to 4.69 percent more than households re-
ceiving monthly billing and 2.76 to 5.26 percent more than bi-monthly billing. The
IHD and month effects become insignificantly different from one another after the
third month of the trial. This further suggests that improving real time information
is most effective in the early months of the trial.
2.7.2 Non-peak hours
Table 2.6, Columns 1 and 3 show effects of information on usage for hours
before peak (from 8am to 5pm) and after peak (from 7pm to 11pm), respectively.
The periods are treated as separate periods to account for differences in household
behaviors during times of daylight and evening. Bi-monthly billing does not have
any significant effects on usage during either time period. Monthly billing maintains
consistent and significant reductions on average by 2.18 to 3.44 percent before peak
and insignificant reductions post peak. This can be due to households waiting until
after the peak period to run their appliances or turning on lights, making it less
likely to have reductions in consumption. In Column 1, IHDs suggest significant
reductions in usage within the first five months of the trial but at a decreasing rate
from 5.16 down to 1.59 percent. The IHD group reduces its consumption during this
period more than the bi-monthly group by 2.19 to 3.38 percent during the first four
months. In Column 3, the post peak period IHD group reveal significant differences
between 2.18 and 3.92 percent more in reductions than the bi-monthly group for the
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first three months.
Estimates for nighttime hours (between 11pm and 7:59am) are reported in
Table 2.6 Column 4. In contrast with the average treatment effects during day times,
average treatment effects for bi-monthly billing show an increase in usage from a
weakly significant 1.69 percent to a significant 2.47 percent in March and remains
consistent throughout the year. Estimates for monthly households are insignificant.
Households with IHDs show a similar pattern as households on monthly billing by
starting out with reductions in the first month before showing significant increasing
usage effects in the fourth month. The increase in usage varies between 1.41 and 2.53
percent. This shift in electricity usage from peak and day periods to the night period
implies households wait until after 11pm or before 8am to run major appliances. The
effects of the treatments are not significantly different from one another after the
first month for all information treatments.
2.7.3 Alternative specifications
Table 2.8 includes alternative specifications to Equation 2.1 estimated for the
peak period. I utilize data at a higher resolution (i.e. hourly) to estimate treatment
effects. Column 1 reveals similar usage patterns and significant hourly decrease of
3.54 to 6.48 percent. Estimates are smaller in magnitude since average treatment
effects reductions are estimated by hour for each period compared to previous esti-
mates for reduction per period. Despite introducing 535 fixed effects the estimates
remain robust for each treatment across the four periods.
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FE, hourly FE, DOT FE, CEM
(1) (2) (3)
Bi-monthly Billing
January -0.029*** (0.007) -0.039*** (0.009) -0.036*** (0.013)
February -0.015*** (0.006) -0.022*** (0.008) -0.029*** (0.011)
March -0.021*** (0.005) -0.030*** (0.008) -0.023** (0.011)
April -0.027*** (0.005) -0.036*** (0.008) -0.024* (0.012)
May -0.032*** (0.006) -0.046*** (0.008) -0.036*** (0.011)
June -0.031*** (0.006) -0.043*** (0.008) -0.035*** (0.012)
July -0.029*** (0.006) -0.043*** (0.009) -0.048*** (0.012)
August -0.033*** (0.006) -0.047*** (0.009) -0.048*** (0.013)
September -0.034*** (0.006) -0.048*** (0.009) -0.059*** (0.012)
October -0.032*** (0.006) -0.044*** (0.009) -0.041*** (0.012)
November -0.033*** (0.007) -0.046*** (0.010) -0.047*** (0.013)
December -0.017** (0.008) -0.023** (0.010) -0.026* (0.015)
Monthly Billing
January -0.034*** (0.007) -0.045*** (0.009) -0.052*** (0.013)
February -0.022*** (0.006) -0.031*** (0.009) -0.039*** (0.012)
March -0.027*** (0.006) -0.037*** (0.008) -0.037*** (0.011)
April -0.032*** (0.005) -0.045*** (0.008) -0.049*** (0.012)
May -0.034*** (0.005) -0.048*** (0.008) -0.052*** (0.011)
June -0.033*** (0.005) -0.047*** (0.008) -0.056*** (0.011)
July -0.038*** (0.006) -0.054*** (0.009) -0.057*** (0.012)
August -0.038*** (0.006) -0.054*** (0.009) -0.066*** (0.013)
September -0.039*** (0.006) -0.056*** (0.008) -0.069*** (0.012)
October -0.037*** (0.006) -0.052*** (0.009) -0.057*** (0.012)
November -0.039*** (0.007) -0.054*** (0.009) -0.057*** (0.013)
December -0.032*** (0.007) -0.043*** (0.010) -0.061*** (0.015)
IHD + Bi-monthly Billing
January -0.067*** (0.007) -0.093*** (0.009) -0.089*** (0.012)
February -0.050*** (0.006) -0.071*** (0.009) -0.078*** (0.012)
March -0.042*** (0.006) -0.058*** (0.008) -0.057*** (0.011)
April -0.036*** (0.005) -0.049*** (0.008) -0.045*** (0.012)
May -0.038*** (0.006) -0.053*** (0.008) -0.050*** (0.010)
June -0.038*** (0.006) -0.053*** (0.008) -0.052*** (0.011)
July -0.036*** (0.006) -0.051*** (0.009) -0.042*** (0.012)
August -0.042*** (0.006) -0.060*** (0.009) -0.055*** (0.012)
September -0.049*** (0.006) -0.070*** (0.008) -0.081*** (0.011)
October -0.040*** (0.006) -0.053*** (0.008) -0.054*** (0.011)
November -0.046*** (0.007) -0.064*** (0.010) -0.073*** (0.013)
December -0.040*** (0.008) -0.055*** (0.010) -0.060*** (0.015)
Weekday fixed yes yes yes
Month×year yes yes yes
Heating degree S(+) no S(+)
Holiday NS no S(-)
Daylight Hours S(-) no S(-)
Households 3,334 3,334 1,884
Observations 2,470,546 1,278,568 723,255
Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Table 2.8: Robustness Estimation of Average Treatment Effects for Peak Consump-
tion
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Table 2.8 Column 2 shows estimates with day of the trial fixed effects t. Despite
introducing 535 additional controls, the estimates remain robust for each treatment
across the four periods. Substituting daily seasonal controls with daily fixed effects
yields similar results of 4.78 to 8.88 percent in peak reductions. Column 3 models
estimated with CEM data show IHD effects to range from 4.01 to 8.52 percent dur-
ing the peak period, similar to that of the original specification. Similar to findings
for Equation 2.1, effects begin to dissipate after the first month and match the re-
ductions of the monthly billing group after March. The new estimates show peak
effects to have larger magnitudes in a majority of the estimates for monthly and
IHD group and bi-monthly effects for the last four months of the year.
2.7.4 Daily Level Average Treatment Effects
Results in Table 2.9 show how the provision of information in conjugation with
a price policy such as TOU pricing encourages households to reduce their average
weekday usage. Households respond differently to TOU pricing depending on the
frequency of billing and reports. Providing reports with bi-monthly bills does not
affect usage during any month in the trial. Monthly billing shows significant reduc-
tions in overall usage during 6 nonconsecutive months of the trial up to 2.86 percent
in Column 2, and 3.63 percent for CEM adjusted estimates during the latter half
of the trial in Column 5. The largest reductions come from the early months of





Jan-Mar -0.001 (0.010) 0.008 (0.014)
Apr-Jun -0.004 (0.009) 0.014 (0.013)
Jul-Sep -0.014 (0.010) -0.013 (0.014)
Oct-Dec -0.009 (0.011) -0.009 (0.016)
Monthly Billing
Jan-Mar -0.016 (0.010) -0.018 (0.014)
Apr-Jun -0.016* (0.009) -0.019 (0.013)
Jul-Sep -0.020* (0.011) -0.033** (0.015)
Oct-Dec -0.025** (0.011) -0.039** (0.016)
IHD + Bi-monthly Billing
Jan-Mar -0.042*** (0.010) -0.042*** (0.013)
Apr-Jun -0.014 (0.009) -0.017 (0.013)
Jul-Sep -0.013 (0.010) -0.023 (0.014)
Oct-Dec -0.019* (0.011) -0.020 (0.015)
Weekday fixed effects yes yes
Month×year fixed effects yes yes
Heating degree days S(+) S(+)
Holiday S(+) S(+)
Daylight hours S(-) S(-)
Households 3,334 1,884
Observations 1,278,568 722,671
Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Table 2.9: Monthly Average Treatment Effects for Weekday Consump-
tion
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Full Sample July 14 - December 31
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
FE FE, CEM FE FE, CEM
Bi-monthly Billing -0.007 -0.000 -0.013 -0.012
(0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012)
Monthly Billing -0.019*** -0.027** -0.023** -0.037***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.009) (0.014)
IHD + Bi-monthly Billing -0.022*** -0.025** -0.017** -0.023*
(0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012)
Weekday fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Month×year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Heating degree days S(+) S(+) S(+) S(+)
Holiday S(+) S(+) S(+) S(+)
Daylight hours S(-) S(-) S(-) S(-)
Households 3,334 1,884 3,334 1,884
Observations 1,278,568 722,671 818,872 465,905
Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Table 2.10: Average Treatment Effects for Weekday Consumption
after March. The CEM approach shows a slightly lower estimate for January of
5.26 percent. Estimates in Column 6 tend to be higher in magnitude and more
significant than their counterparts in Column 3. Providing a household with real
time information appears to have a larger effect on the overall daily consumption
although much of the reduction came from the beginning of the trial. Much of the
reduction disappears after the arrival of the first bill in March.
While the main purpose of a TOU pricing is to encourage households to shift
consumption away from peak times and alleviate grid congestion during peak hours,
improving information provision appears to attain reductions in overall consump-
tion. Table 2.10 Columns 1a and 1b show an overall reduction of 1.88 percent for
monthly billing and a 2.18 percent reduction after CEM adjustment, respectively.
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Savings Savings 10 year Additional Cost
for year 1 for years 2-10 savings treatment cost per kWh
(kWh/year) (kWh/year) (kWh) per year
IHD* 67.13 52.01 535.19 e2.30-6.15 e0.043-0.0115
M** 58.07 70.15 689.43 e4.38-6.42 e0.064-0.093
BM 0 0 0 e0 e0
Notes: *Cost of device estimated between e23.04-61.48 [27]. **Ireland domestic mail costs
approximately e0.48-0.57 cents per unit for bulk mailers (Postal rates based on bulk mailer rates
from www.anpost.ie). Assuming each bill has printing cost (paper, ink, data processing, etc.) of
e0.25-0.50 for 6 bills per year additional to the bi-monthly bills. The minimum additional cost
to monthly billing will be (e0.48 + e0.25)×6 months = e4.38 per year. Estimates converted
to 2014 values for comparison.
Table 2.11: Information Treatment Cost Comparison
IHD treatment has larger reductions of 2.27 percent and 2.47 percent, respectively.
Estimates for overall weekend consumption were found to be insignificant (not shown
here). Columns 2a and 2b show estimates for the testing period restricted to the sec-
ond half of the trial from July 14 through December 31. For monthly billing, I find
a reduction of 2.27 percent, consistent with estimates reported by the Commission
of Energy Regulation [20], and a 3.63 percent reduction after CEM adjustment. In
comparison, I find a 1.69 percent reduction and 2.27 percent after CEM adjustment
for the IHD treatment. Estimates for Bi-monthly billing are insignificant. While es-
timates comparing monthly billing and IHD show differing results under full sample
and restricted sample analysis, t-tests reveal monthly billing and IHD estimates are
not significantly different from one another for all four models.
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2.7.5 Cost Comparison
I use the empirical results in Table 2.10 to estimate weekday savings for the
average treatment effects in a back of the envelope calculation. I assume that esti-
mates from Table 11 Column 1a reflect savings from the first year of the intervention
and Column 2a for the years following, as the initial large impact from the start
of the trial would have dissipated. I find that over a 10 year period, information
treatments would result in weekday savings of 535.19 kWh (equivalent to powering
a 60 Watt light bulb for 371.66 days) for IHD households, 689.43 kWh for monthly
billing (equivalent to powering a 60 Watt bulb for 478.77 days), and 0 kWh for
bi-monthly billing (see Table 2.11).15
Assuming an IHD costs between e23 and e60 with a life expectancy of 10
years [27], the cost per kWh saved is e0.043-0.115. In comparison with monthly
billing over 10 years, the cost for printing and delivery, assumed to fall between
e43.80 and e64.20, will result in cost per kWh saved to be e0.064-0.093. Based on
these assumptions, the cost of a monitor will have to be less than e34.25 in order
to be more cost effective than monthly billing. Both estimates induce cost effective
energy savings as they are both less than the flat rate tariff per kWh of electricity
prior to the start of the trial (14.1 cents/ kWh). However, monthly billing may
generate more cost savings than an IHD.




The aim of this study was to estimate the effects of information provision in
conjunction with a TOU pricing scheme that motivates consumers to shift or reduce
their consumption from peak to off peak periods of the day. It is important to note
that the results in this paper are specific to a single experiment and may not be
applicable in other situations. Past studies have argued that information alone is
not enough to encourage change in behavior and adoption of conservation practices.
Households need additional incentives to encourage participation. At the same time,
the effectiveness of pricing policies applied to reflect the real price of electricity might
be dampened due to imperfect information on the consumer side. Information on
usage and energy prices will allow households to make more informed and more
efficient decisions on their energy consumption during various times of the day.
Previous studies have analyzed the effects of information with pricing policies
but none have yet compared the billing frequency with information technology with
a policy designed to curtail usage during specific times. This paper studies the
combination of information with pricing to analyze how households adapt to different
types of information provision over time. Findings suggest that at the beginning of
the testing period there is a period of learning from households with IHDs where
large reductions in usage are made. These gains in conservation quickly diminish
after the third month, around the time of the arrival of the first bill. After this
learning period, IHDs continue to reduce consumption during the peak period but
at levels similar to households on monthly and bi-monthly billing. This suggests
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that households have learned all they can from the IHD and the display has blended
into the background of household routines. On the contrary, adaptation to the
treatment during peak times for the monthly and bi-monthly treatment groups are
at a gradual increase throughout the trial.
From a conservation perspective, IHDs appear to have a larger impact on
reducing overall energy usage but most of these gains come from the beginning
of the trial. When analyzing effects from the latter half of the trial, households
on monthly billing are able to reduce their overall consumption more than IHD
households. While real time information is effective in reducing initial consumption,
it may be less effective in encouraging conservation practices than conventional
billing methods in the long run. It should be noted that seasonality could play a
factor in the responsiveness associated with IHDs in the early months of the trial,
which also happen to be the coldest months of the year. However this is not a huge
concern due to the low proportion of households that rely on electricity as their
main fuel for space heating and the monthly fixed effects.
One suggestion to maintain the strength of the effects is to increase the fre-
quency of bills for households with IHDs. Households are reminded more frequently
through the “shock” of receiving their bill to reduce their consumption. Addition-
ally, to prevent IHDs from falling into the household routines, utilities can change
TOU rates on a quarterly basis allowing households to adjust their consumption
and a more flexible pricing structure to reflect the cost of electricity generation and
demand for different seasons. In practice, some utilities have adopted programs to
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loan IHDs to residential to allow households to learn about their consumption.16
Overall, the provision of information with TOU pricing has strong initial effects
but similar to the suggestions of Torriti (2012), IHD may not be as effective with
TOU pricing as it is in cases where the price of electricity changes more frequently
such as with dynamic pricing. However, there are different drawbacks from applying
TOU versus dynamic pricing as TOU pricing allows for the change and adaptation
of habits and routines whereas critical peak pricing are infrequent events and real
time pricing introduces uncertainty in price. The results are specific to TOU pricing,
which has a routine to it, and may not be applicable to dynamic pricing, which does
not have a routine, and where real time information may well play a vital role that
persists over time. More research will be needed to determine the benefits drawn
from IHDs versus billing frequency with different pricing schemes.




Chapter 3: Time-Of-Use Pricing and Heterogeneity in Consumer Re-
sponse
3.1 Introduction
Growing concerns over environmental quality and climate change have height-
ened policymakers efforts to increase energy savings through energy efficiency and
demand management programs. While these programs were once popular in the
1970s and 80s, they have become increasingly important as of late among those that
wish to reduce energy demand, shift peak load, lower energy bills, and/or curtail
the generation of greenhouse gas emissions [4, 6]).
In recent years, many countries have called for more transparency in suppliers
practices and policies in order to encourage active participation of consumers in the
energy market [20]. In 2009, the European Union passed multiple directives, which
called for its members to implement the widespread installation of “Smart Metering
Systems” that allow utilities to monitor, track, and inform customers of usage in-
formation. These polices, Directive 2009/72/EC and Directive 2009/73/EC, reflect
the growing effort of demand side management to encourage active participation of
consumers and energy efficiency [20,26].
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Overall, these efficiency and demand management programs provide alterna-
tives to the energy suppliers that would otherwise have to increase their generation
and transmission capacities, via capital and time intensive ventures. One such alter-
native scheme available to utilities is time-of-use (TOU) pricing, which encourages
load shifting to the other times of the day. During hours of peak demand, suppliers
must purchase higher cost electricity from the wholesale market in order to meet
the electricity demands. Because of network constraints due to limited generation
and grid capacity, generation and transmission congestion can occur during peak
hours and prevent the delivery of lowest cost electricity to consumers. Congestion
conditions can also reduce the reliability of the grid and make areas more susceptible
to outages with costly impacts [3].1 In addition to more expensive electricity and re-
duced reliability, transmission congestion also results in inefficiency when electricity
is lost through the lines in the form of heat.
The ability for smart meters to record and transmit electricity usage infor-
mation in real time has allowed utilities to offer TOU and other pricing plans to
their customers that encourage load shifting or curtailing demand at specific times.
These plans allow the energy price to vary throughout the day and more accurately
reflect demand and changes in the costs of production [20, 30]. By charging higher
prices during times of peak demand, consumers are encouraged by price signals to
shift their usage to less expensive off peak periods in exchange for lower bills.
1For example, the California electricity crisis in 2000-2001 caused rolling blackouts through the
state due to shortages in electricity supply from market manipulations which resulted in $40 billion
of added energy costs, not including costs from black outs and reductions in economic growth [76].
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The goal of this paper is to study the impact of TOU pricing in a region that
had previously not experienced this type of pricing plan. Concerns exist about the
short duration of typical TOU studies, such as [7,11,58], and are expressed by Sexton
et al. (1987), who question the ability of the trials to accurately reflect consumer
response to TOU pricing. Previous TOU studies consisting of two periods [12, 58],
with the peak period spanning from 12 to 16 hours raises concerns about the ability
to appropriately capture load-shifting effects away from hours of peak demand when
the system is at its peak [57]. To overcome this and other concerns, I examine data
form a trial where the treatment period spans from January through December 2010
and the TOU day is divided into three different TOU pricing periods reflect daily
demand with the peak period spanning two hours. This trial was conducted in the
Republic of Ireland.
In addition to analyzing the effects of TOU pricing on different hours of the
day, I examine the heterogeneity in the TOU effects to identify the characteristics of
households most responsive to TOU pricing. Determining these characteristics has
policy implications for targeting customer groups to optimize load-shifting efforts.
Finally, I assess the total impact of TOU pricing to determine whether there exists
evidence of overall savings in energy usage and bills paid.
The Irish trial was studied by Di Cosmo et al. (2014) who used random
effects models for each period of the day to estimate the impact of TOU pricing and
information stimuli on usage. However, such a model imposes strong assumptions
on the nature of the unobserved heterogeneity and its correlation with observables.
I use a fixed effects model and check carefully for significant differences between the
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control and treatment group, which is critical for unbiased difference-in-difference
estimation. I do not distinguish the different information treatments, which are
examined in a separate paper in the previous chapter.
Since I estimate regressions for hourly weekday and weekend usage to analyze
the effects of the treatment, I find that reductions in peak usage during the weekdays
carry over to the weekends even when peak pricing is not in place. I also find that
the effect of the TOU pricing scheme vary with the initial level of usage: the lowest
quintile shows evidence of increasing overall usage, whereas households in the upper
quintiles show the greatest reduction in their overall usage. A simple calculation
and comparison of usage and bills shows, on average, households may be able to
increase their overall usage all the while reducing their monthly bill, similar to the
main findings in [73].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the litera-
ture, section 3 gives a brief overview of the trial, section 4 describes the models, and
section 5 the data. Section 6 presents the estimation results and section 7 concludes.
3.2 Relevant Literature
In recent years, a number of papers have studied consumer response to ex-
treme price jump such as the impact of critical peak pricing (CPP) on residential
consumption [51, 53, 78]. CPP differs from TOU pricing in that the former is occa-
sional, whereas TOU exists as a stable recurring plan where the price of electricity
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is high during peak hours and low during off peak hours. In principle, this allows
customers to adjust their habits of consumption according to price changes during
fixed periods throughout the day.
Historically, TOU studies undertaken in the 1980s focused primarily on esti-
mating own and cross price elasticities using monthly aggregate consumption during
peak and off peak periods [19,44,55].
Baladi et al. (1998) compare usage patterns of a flat rate tariff with the tariff
of a voluntary TOU program and estimate demand response using the conditional
demand system model in Caves et al. (1984). Their results indicate 4.7 percentage
point reduction in share of peak usage under the TOU rate in the first stage. The
tariff structure in the experiment only consists of a peak (noon-7pm) and off peak
period (rest of the day) and did not offer pricing levels at varying degrees. Thus a
single elasticity of substitution between peak and off-peak electricity consumption
can be estimated. Their main finding is that households under volunteer TOU do
not experience significantly larger effects than households on a mandatory TOU
scheme.
Filippini (1995a) estimated elasticities for TOU pricing using city level data in
Switzerland by deriving the indirect utility function and finds static short- (long-)
run elasticities to be -0.6 (-0.71) during peak hours and -0.71 (-1.92) during off peak
hours. Filippini (1995b) uses the same data to estimate partial elasticities using an
almost ideal demand system model.
More recently, Filippini (2011) argues that the previous studies estimated short
run elasticities that do not allow customers to react to changes in price and do not
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account for investments in energy efficient appliances and retrofits. In his study, he
estimates own price elasticities using a dynamic partial adjustment approach and
aggregate consumption data from 22 cities in Switzerland that range from 2000 to
2006. Short- (long-) run own price elasticities to range from -0.77 (-1.60) to -0.84
(-2.26) during the peak period and -0.65 (-1.27) to -0.75 (-1.65) during the off peak
period. These estimates are very similar to his findings in Filippini (1995a). One
limitation of the study is that the data are aggregated at the municipal city level,
that there are few cities (22) and the length of the longitudinal component is short.
Researchers have been attempting to model how variable pricing affects resi-
dential demand for electricity for some time. While general consensus is that TOU
and real time pricing are effective in load shifting, the findings on overall conserva-
tion are mixed. Sexton et al. (1989) analyzes the effects of providing households
with monitors displaying their usage information in a TOU experiment. They es-
timate a maximum likelihood model using the weekday ratio of peak and off peak
usage. Despite finding evidence of load shifting, they do not find evidence of over-
all conservation. Allcott (2011), on the other hand, finds evidence of households
conserving energy usage during peak hours and did not shift consumption over to
off-peak hours in a real time pricing experiment. Matsukawa (2001) investigates
the impact of TOU pricing using cross-sectional data on electricity consumption
and household survey on Japanese households. Evidence of load shifting is small
compared to the incentives, which he attributes to the 16 peak periods.
Other studies have compared the before and after effects of TOU pricing on
residential household consumption. Torriti (2012) compares the time-related elec-
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tricity consumption before (July 1, 2009 - June 30, 2010) and after (July 1, 2010
- June 30, 2011) the introduction of TOU tariffs in Northern Italy and finds that
consumption of electricity increased by 13.69 percent but bills decreased by 2.21
percent. Additionally, there is evidence of peak usage shifting to the hour prior to
the start of the peak pricing period in the morning and after the end of the peak
pricing period in the evening. While these results indicate changes in habits such
as waiting to start appliances after a peak period, Torriti notes of a third peak
emerging in the middle of the peak pricing period which goes against expectations
of shifting consumption away from higher priced periods. Similarly, Bartusch et al.
(2011) conduct a before and after demand response analysis of TOU pricing study
implemented in Sweden. They find evidence of load shifting by 0.8 percentage points
and an overall decline in usage by 11.1 percent over the first year.
3.3 Trial Design
In this paper I use the data from the Irish TOU trial. The Republic of Irelands
Commission of Energy Regulation (CER) conducted the Irish Consumer Behavior
Trial as part of the National Smart Metering Plan. The trial took place in 2008-
2011 to investigate the impact of smart metering technology combined with TOU
tariffs and feedback stimuli on consumer behavior on reductions in peak demand
and overall electricity use [20].
There are four phases to the trial. A timeline and description of the trial
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are shown in Figure 2.1. The Pre-Benchmark period occurred from March 2008
through June 2009. During this period participant recruitment took place in four
waves. Each wave was adjusted to ensure that the sample was representative of the
national population. Smart meters are also installed in participating homes.
From July through December of 2009, the Benchmark period gathered baseline
data prior to the start of the test period. During this time, customers are on a bi-
monthly billing schedule and the pre-trial survey is conducted. Participants are
also randomly assigned to control and treatment groups. Additionally, to ensure
households did not pay more than they normally would were they on the regular
tariff schedule, households were given the first half of a balancing credit. During the
Testing period from January through December 2010, the control group continues
to be billed at their existing flat rate at 14.1 cents per kWh on bi-monthly billing
whereas the treatment groups face different TOU tariffs and feedback stimuli. The
trial ends January 1, 2011 and all participants return to their normal billing cycle and
flat rate tariffs. A survey is conducted during this Post-Trial period via telephone
and the treatment group receives the second half of their balancing credit.
Although the original 5,375 participants were self-selected into the trial, the
assignment of treatment and control were randomized. Records were deleted from
the study for participants who withdrew from the trial. A group of households were
selected for a special Weekend tariff group on a different tariff structure than the
residential treatment group, which is subsequently dropped from this study. Of the
original sample, 2,406 remain in the Residential TOU treatment group and 928 in
the control group.
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Participants in the Residential group are assigned two treatments. The first
is the TOU tariff that introduces variation in price throughout the day where each
household is assigned to one of four TOU pricing structures shown in Table 2.1.
A weekday for the treatment group is divided into four periods where the price of
electricity reflects the demand of electricity for those periods. The night period
spans from 11pm to 7:59am is the lowest cost period, followed by the day period
from 8am to 4:59pm and 7pm to 10:59pm, while the peak period, from 5pm to
6:59pm, has the highest tariff. Weekend days and public holidays exclude the peak
period and are divided into two periods with the day period spanning from 8am to
10:59pm and the night period from 11pm to 7:59am.
In addition to variation in price throughout the day is variation in price be-
tween treatment groups. Households in Treatment Group A have the highest night-
time rate of e0.12/kWh and daytime rate of e0.14/kWh and these rates decrease
with each group. However, with having the highest off peak rates it also has the
lowest peak rate of e0.20/kWh and increases with the next group. I expect that
households in Group D, with the highest peak rate and lowest off peak rates, will
reduce their peak usage the most.
Each household in the treatment group is also assigned to an information
stimulus group that provides household usage and billing in the form of a monthly,
bi-monthly, and in-home display.2 In addition to a utility bill, households also
2The IHD relays real time information every 30 minutes on current electricity usage and cost.
The monitor includes a preset budget setting mechanism that allows households to set maximum
daily spending amount on electricity.
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receive an energy usage statement that provides detailed information on their usage
and tips on how to reduce their electricity usage. The effects of these treatments
are averaged, as I am only looking at the effects of TOU pricing on usage in this
paper. Assignment to the information treatment is orthogonal to the pricing scheme
assignment.
Participants completed pre- and post trial surveys that gathered socio demo-
graphic data about the respondent and household. Questions include respondents
age, gender, employment status, and income bracket. These questions also cover
household characteristics such as the square footage of the house, number of people
residing in the home, types of fuel used for space heating and cooking, number of
electronics and appliances. A majority of the questions in the second half of the
survey assess usage behavior during the trial. I will be mainly utilizing information
gathered from the pre-trial survey.
3.4 Methods
3.4.1 Research Question and Econometric Model
The goal of this paper is to examine the effects of time-of-use pricing on house-
hold energy consumption in an area that had time-constant pricing before the im-
plementation of the trial. I ask three research questions. First, I am interested in
whether there is a significant reduction in peak usage when the price of electricity
is the highest. Second, I am especially interested in whether this reduction in peak
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usage is a reduction in overall usage or a shift in usage to another period of the









where Yihdmyw is the natural log of household is hourly electricity usage in kWh
for period P of each weekday w, day d in month m of year y, Sdmy is a vector
of seasonal variables including an indicator for a bank holiday, the natural log of
heating degree-days and daylight hours, θh are dummies for the period of the day,
ρw denotes day of the week dummies, and φmy is a set of month-year dummies.
Observations where residents of the household are away from home determined by a
daily usage that is below 0.1 kWh for 12 consecutive days or more are dropped from
the analysis. Period is a vector of dummy variables for the four periods of the day,
P ∈ Day1, P eak,Day2, Night. TREAT is a vector of dummy variables that equals
1 for whether household i is assigned to tariff treatment, T = A,B,C,D, during the
trial period and 0 for the control group and all observations in the pre-trial period.
The coefficients βp,t are the average treatment effects by period of the day P
and tariff treatment T . Finally, εihdmyw is an unobserved error term. The model
results are reported using the “within” estimator. I estimate Model 1 separately
for weekday and weekend observations to account for differences in daily routines.
I cluster all standard errors at the household level.
I estimate additional specifications to assess for the robustness of the estimates.
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First I estimate Equation 3.1 for weekdays where I use day of the trial fixed effects
(373 dummies, excluding holidays). Next, I limit the observations to period between
July 14 and December 31 in 2009 and 2010. This is because baseline data in 2009
was only gathered for this period.
Similar to that of Houde et al. (2013), I estimate the treatment effects each
individual hour of the day to gain further insight on electricity usage, reductions,
and increases for specific hours of the day. In doing so, I can observe whether during
which times the greatest increases and decreases in usage occur and whether there
are formation of new peaks. I regress a model similar to that of Equation 3.1 to
obtain hourly treatment effects by aggregating the treatment group and interacting
them with the hours of the day:
Yihdmyw = αi + θh + ρw + φmy + γSdmy + (θh × TREATiy) + εihdmyw (3.2)
where the interaction term is allowed to take on different coefficients depending on
the different hour of the day, where h = 1, , 24.
My study design relies on the common trends assumption, which I test. I run
a fixed effects panel regression with a time trend to ensure that preexisting trends
across the control and treatment groups are similar prior to the start of the trial.
I regress the natural log of usage on the day of the year dummies interacted with
TREAT before the treatment period:
Yihdmyw = αi + θh + ρw + φdm + γSdm + (φdm × TREATi) + εihdmyw (3.3)
where φdm is a vector of day by month dummies. I test the null hypothesis that the
coefficients on (φdm × TREATi) are jointly equal to zero.
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3.4.2 Heterogeneous Peak Effects
My third research question is about the driving forces of the peak period
treatment effects. I check for heterogeneous effects for different households by esti-
mating the following two-step estimation procedure. I estimate a modified version
of Equation 3.1:
Yhdmyw = αi + θh + ρw + φmy + γSdmy +
∑
p∈P
βp([Periodh]p × posty) + εhdmyw (3.4)
for each individual household i, a total of 3,334 regressions. This difference approach
compares a household with its usage from before and after the treatment period to
obtain individual βPeak. The βPeak for each household is regressed on household
characteristics using OLS with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
In the second step, I estimate the following model:
β̂Peak,i =γ0 + γ1Age1i + γ2Age2i + γ3RTAi + γ4RTBi + γ5RTCi + γ6RTDi+
γ7ThirdEdui + γ8Resi + γ9Employi + γ10Homeowneri + γ11FloorSqfti+
γ12MissingSqfti + γ13DetHousei + γ14Bdrmsi + γ15Applsi + γ16Elecsi+
γ17ElecHeati + εi
(3.5)
where Age1 and Age2 are indicator variables for respondents between ages 18
to 35 and 36 to 55, respectively, ThirdEdu is an indicator for respondents with at
least a third level education equivalent to a college degree, Res is the number of
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residents residing in the household, Employ is an indicator for whether respondent is
employed, andHomeowner indicates whether the respondent owns or pays mortgage
on the place of residence. Additionally, RTA, RTB, RTC, and RTD are indicators
for households assigned to one of the four TOU treatment groups. A variable for
income is omitted due to inconsistencies in survey reporting.
Household characteristics include FloorSqft for the square footage of the
home. This variable has a large number of missing observations as this question
may be left blank if the respondent did not know the size of his/her home or did not
wish to respond to the question. In order to prevent households with missing values
from being dropped from the analysis, the missing values in FloorSqft are recoded
to zero and a dummy, MissingSqft, is used to indicate whether a household is miss-
ing square footage information. Other household characteristics include the number
of bedrooms Bdrms, appliances Appls, and electronics Elecs, and DetHouse, which
is an indicator for a detached house or bungalow. Additionally, a dummy ElecHeat
is included for households that rely mainly on electric space heating to warm their
homes during winter months. An income variable is omitted due inconsistencies in
reporting.
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3.4.3 Quantile Regression and Conditional Average Treatment Ef-
fects
As utilities have limited information about their customers’ socio economic
information, it is difficult to target customers who will be the most responsive to
pricing policies based on these characteristics. However, utilities are able to separate
the low users from the high users with historic electricity consumption data. By
exploring heterogeneity based on usage in response to price, we can gain insight on
the customers who are most responsive to treatment.
Literature suggest that households may be able to take advantage of the lower
off peak pricing and increase their overall usage all the while reducing their energy
bills [5, 73]. Other studies have found no effects as reductions in usage during peak
times are offset by increases in usage in other times [68], and in some cases, the
lowest users are able to increase their overall daily usage [35]. If this were the case,
then this would suggest that TOU pricing might allow the lowest electricity users
to re-optimize consumption.
Highest users will have the most leeway in reducing usage than middle and low
users [43]. This is consistent with studies that argue that it gets harder to reduce
their usage after a certain point, more than just changing habits without upgrading
appliances and investing in energy efficient retrofits [9, 40, 54].
The estimation of panel fixed effects quantile regression is adapted from a two-
step estimation procedure developed by Ivan Canay (2011) to determine whether
treatment effects vary across light and heavy electricity users. My adaptation is
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similar to that of Alberini et al. (2016):
Pr(Yit ≤ xitβ(τ) + αi|xit, αi) = τ (3.6)
where τ is a specific quantile. I analyze usage at the septiles.
By the assumption that the fixed effects are independent of τ , the model can
be written as:
Yit = xitβµ + αi + uit. (3.7)
In this two-step estimation procedure, the dependent variable is transformed
into Yit − α̂i, where α̂i are the estimated household fixed effects from “within”
estimation in the first step [6]. In the second step, βµ is estimated with quan-
tile regression. Estimates produced by the two-step estimator are consistent and
asymptotically normal [15].
Wichman (2015) models heterogeneity in residential water demand and dis-
cusses concerns about the strong assumption of rank preservation necessary for the
validity of FE quantile regression estimates. Rank preservation means that if each
household was ranked by their usage, this order must be preserved over time. In this
case, this condition is weakly met in that some users ranks may change in response
to the treatment but their assigned septiles are assumed to be preserved.
In addition to FE quantile regressions, I estimate conditional average treat-
ment effects with the following model:
Yidmyw = αi + θh + ρw +φmy + γSdmy +
∑
q∈Q
βq([Sidmy]q ×TREATiy) + εihdmyw (3.8)
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where βq captures the conditional average treatment effects depending on the differ-
ent septile, indicated by a vector of dummies in Sidmy. Equation 3.8 is a modification
of Equation 3.1 with observations aggregated to the daily level, all else the same.
3.5 Data
3.5.1 Electricity usage data
I use hourly electricity consumption data extensively in my analysis. The base-
line data are collected from July 14 through December 31, 2009. Treatment period
data were collected from January 1 through December 21, 2010. The Commission
for Energy Regulation in the Republic of Ireland reports that the average household
uses 5,067 kWh of electricity in 2009 [72].3 The average daily consumption of the
households in the sample range from 11.67-12.26 kWh are calculated from the base-
line data from July to December 2009. The households in this sample use roughly
estimated at around 4,258 to 4,475 kWh in 2009, less electricity than the country
average. This is a lower bound as I expect electricity usage to be higher during the
winter months of January through early March that is not captured in the baseline
3Information from the World Energy Council and Enerdata show that Irelands 2009 annual
household electricity consumption (at 5,157 kWh, slightly higher than what is reported by the
SEIA) to be to be similar to that of Belgium (4,405 kWh), the UK (4,525 kWh), and France
(5,374 kWh). On average, Irish households consume more than Italy (2,772 kWh), Germany
(3,459 kWh), Greece (4,030 kWh), and Spain (4,147 kWh) but less than Sweden (8,888 kWh),
Canada (11,083 kWh), the US (12,283 kWh), and Norway (16,844 kWh).
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data.
Table 3.1 breaks down the baseline usage by hour for each period of the day
for weekend and weekdays. The Day1 period shows lower usage than the Day2 rate
for the weekdays. This is not surprising as the hours during the Day1 periods are
also the same hours people attend school and work. This is graphically depicted
in Figure 3.1(a). The same pattern is not reflected in Figure 3.1(b) where there is
more fluctuation in the average daily weekend usage throughout the course of the
day.
Figures 3.1(a) and 3.1(b) show the hour-by-hour usage for the pre trial and
trial (treatment) period for the treatment group. Usage is noticeably more spread
out during the course of the day during weekends whereas there is a sharp increase
in usage during the peak period during the weekdays. Without accounting for sea-
son and unobserved heterogeneity of the households, the figures show a majority of
reductions occur between 4 pm and 10 pm and slight increases in usage at night.
3.5.2 Weather and household variables
The temperature in Fahrenheit is an average of the average daily temperature
from the Cork, Dublin, Galway, and Shannon weather monitoring stations. The
temperature correlations between the stations range from 0.963-0.980, suggesting
that it is reasonable to use a single average value of the observations from each
station. The year 2009 was a warmer year than 2010 with annual average heating
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Treatment Control p-value Population
Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.)
Day1 weekday usage 0.51 (0.62) 0.49 (0.60) 0.01 -
Peak weekday usage 0.85 (0.85) 0.80 (0.82) 0.03 -
Day2 weekday usage 0.78 (0.71) 0.74 (0.71) 0.02 -
Night weekday usage 0.29 (0.37) 0.27 (0.35) 0.00 -
Day weekend usage 0.68 (0.75) 0.65 (0.74) 0.00 -
Night weekend usage 0.28 (0.34) 0.27 (0.33) 0.00 -
Demographics
No. of residents 3.07 (2.21) 2.86 (2.20) 0.02 2.70
Age of respondent 18-35 (%) 11.00 (0.31) 9.46 (0.29) 0.21 22.27
Age of respondent 36-55 (%) 46.98 (0.50) 41.79 (0.50) 0.01 41.19
No formal education (%) 1.36 (0.12) 1.64 (0.13) 0.58 36.53
Primary education (%) 10.88 (0.31) 15.32 (0.36) 0.00 1.36
Secondary education (%) 47.13 (0.50) 47.61 (0.50) 0.82 16.40
Third level education (%) 40.63 (0.49) 35.43 (0.48) 0.01 49.50
Employed (%) 52.07 (0.49) 53.91 (0.50) 0.00 28.89
Unemployed (%) 8.79 (0.28) 7.29 (0.26) 0.17 11.03
Retired/caretaker (%) 29.15 (0.45) 38.80 (0.48) 0.00 23.44
Housing Characteristics
Homeowner (%) 92.99 (0.25) 93.34 (0.25) 0.73 69.70
No. of bedrooms 3.47 (0.83) 3.42 (0.87) 0.16 -
Apartment (%) 1.65 (0.13) 1.96 (0.14) 0.58 10.74
Semi-detached home (%) 33.42 (0.47) 29.11 (0.45) 0.02 27.61
Detached home/bungalow (%) 50.33 (0.50) 54.44 (0.50) 0.04 42.31
Terraced home (%) 14.60 (0.35) 14.49 (0.35) 0.94 17.04
No. of appliancesa 6.09 (1.90) 6.01 (1.91) 0.27 -
No. of electronicsb 4.08 (2.30) 3.72 (2.23) 0.00 -
Electric space heatingc (%) 6.88 (0.25) 7.68 (0.27) 0.46 8.49
Electric water heatingd (%) 62.36 (0.48) 61.85 (0.49) 0.80 -
Note: aAppliances, include dryers, washers, dishwashers, electric cookers, freezers, and water pops top,
are coded at 3; bElectronics, include televisions, computers, laptop, and game consoles, are top coded
at 4; cElectric heating includes central heating, storage heating, and plug-in heaters; dElectric water
heating includes central, immersion, or instantaneous water heater. Household population statistics are
from the 2011 Census reported from the Irish Central Statistics Office. For the population statistics,
Age is percentage of population between ages 18-35, 36-55, and 56 and up; percentage of education is
based on education level of people over the age of 15.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
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(a) Weekday Hourly Usage
(b) Weekend and Holiday Hourly Usage
Figure 3.1: Weekday and Weekend Hourly Usage Comparison for the Treatment
Group
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degree-days of 5794.85 and 6414.95, respectively. The moderate temperatures of
Ireland do not go above 65 F and thus do not require a variable for cooling degree-
days. In addition to controlling for the temperature, I also control for the number
of hours of daylight, which averages 4486.19 hours of daylight per year.
A pre-trial survey was conducted to gather socio-demographic information
and structural characteristics of the home information. A total of 2,755 households
completed the survey, an 82.6 percent response rate. Chapter 2 Table 5 compares
the summary demographic and housing characteristic information across the treat-
ment and control households. T tests reveal that Treatment households tend to be
younger, employed, and more educated. Electricity consumption by hour is up to 6
percent higher among treatment households. However, these differences and other
unobservable characteristics are assumed to be time constant and can be controlled
for using individual household fixed effects.
In comparison to the population statistics in Ireland in the last column of
Table 3.1, households in the trial are older, more educated, and more likely to own
a single-family home than the average household in Ireland. Employment, number
of residents, and electric space heating in the sample are similar to the population
averages. One concern is whether findings are representative of the entire popula-
tion as trial participation was voluntary.
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3.6 Results
3.6.1 Results from the Difference-in-Difference Approach
A pre-treatment trends check between the treatment and control groups is
conducted to determine whether there are significant differences in trends between
the two groups. I estimate Equation 3.3 and failure to reject the null means no
evidence of difference trends, F169,3419 = 0.99, p = 0.53.
Results from the panel fixed effects difference-in-differences Equation 3.1 are
reported in Table 3.2 Column 1 where reductions during the Day1 period are signifi-
cant for Treatment Groups A and C of 0.80 percent and 0.60 percent per hour of the
period, respectively. I find significant reductions of similar magnitude for the Day2
period for Treatment Group B and D of 1.19 and 1.00 percent reduction per hour.
These estimates are consistent with economic theory in that Group A will have a
larger reduction than Group C in that Group A has a higher day time rate than
Group C. The same concept applies for Groups B and D. However, it is uncertain
as to why reductions occur during Day1 for Groups A and C whereas significant re-
ductions occur during Day2 for Groups B and D. One reason may be due the sample
size of the treatment groups in that Groups A and C is over twice the number of
households in Groups B and D. While these coefficients are jointly different from 0,
they are not jointly different from each other during their respective periods of the
day.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(a) Weekday Average Treatment Effects by Hour
(b) Weekend Average Treatment Effects by Hour
Figure 3.2: Average Hourly Treatment Effects
in this study. I find that increasing the peak period price for Treatment Group A
results in a 2.66 percent reduction per hour of the peak period. The increase in peak
period price corresponds to increasingly larger reductions with the Group B with a
2.86 percent reduction, Group C with a 3.25 percent reduction, and Group D with a
3.73 percent reduction per hour. However, despite the different tariff schemes, these
estimates are not jointly different from each other, F3,333 = 0.71, p = 0.5477.
Finally, a slightly increased but significant usage of 0.70 to 0.90 percent per
hour from Treatment Groups C and D during the night period. On average, night
period treatment effects for all groups appear to be small and vary in significance,
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which is not surprising given that these estimates are the average effects of 9 hours.
Figure 3.2(a) shows the average treatment for the combined treatment groups by
hour. The first hour of the night period show an increase of 1.18 percent whereas the
estimates for the hours following are insignificant. This suggests that households
shift some of their peak consumption to the hour directly after the Day2 period
when the price of electricity is at its lowest.
I find that increasing a temperature by 1 heating degree-day increases electric-
ity usage by 0.009 percent. This minute effect may be due to the fact that only 1.85
percent of households in our sample rely on electricity for heating through central
heating and plug in heaters. In addition, longer daylight hours imply a reduction
in electricity usage as longer daylight hours generally indicates delaying turning on
lights and more time spent outdoors.
Column 2 shows the average period treatment effects for the weekend to be
insignificant during the Day1 period, some reduction for Groups B and D during
the Day2 period, and some increase for Groups A and C during the night. The
surprising element is the significant hourly reduction in the peak period across all
four treatment groups ranging from 1.39 to 1.98 percent. When broken down to the
hourly average effects, shown in Figure 3.2(b), the figure largely resembles that of
the weekday hourly treatment effects. The effects are insignificant for most of the
2am through 4 pm followed by significant reductions from 4 to 10 pm. One possible
reason for this is the formation of habits around the peak pricing periods that carry
over from the weekdays to the weekend when peak pricing is not in effect. Another
reason can be that the period after 4pm is when residents are home and thus respond
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to higher day prices. These reasons can only be taken as conjectures, as there is
not sufficient information available to support the claims or discrimination between
them.
I test the robustness of the results from Model 1 with two other specifications.
I first estimate Equation 3.1 using day of the trial fixed effects for a more flexible
model, shown in Table 3.2 Column 3. I find that estimates closely resemble that
of Equation 3.1. Second, I restrict the data set to only observations from July 14
through December 31 to have a more accurate analysis of the before and after trial
period for the treatment and control groups. These results also closely resemble
that of Equation 3.1.
Finally, I consider a specification where I look at households that completed
the pre-trial survey. This is because analyses reported below are conducted using in-
formation from the survey and households with missing values are dropped from the
regression, thus losing 579 households. I find average treatment effects for the peak
period to yield the largest reductions as well as largest increases during the night
compared to the other specifications. This suggests that households that completed
the pre-trial survey may have originally been more interested in their electricity
usage or completing the survey raised awareness of their electricity usage patterns,
resulting in larger responses to changes in price.
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β̂peak (1) (2) (3)
Detached home -0.009*** (0.003) -0.008*** (0.003) -0.007** (0.003)
Employed 0.001 (0.004) 0.002 (0.004) 0.002 (0.004)
Homeowner -0.008 (0.006) -0.006 (0.006) -0.005 (0.006)
RTA -0.027*** (0.003) -0.027*** (0.003) -0.027*** (0.003)
RTB -0.042*** (0.006) -0.042*** (0.006) -0.043*** (0.006)
RTC -0.039*** (0.004) -0.039*** (0.004) -0.039*** (0.004)
RTD -0.051*** (0.006) -0.051*** (0.006) -0.051*** (0.006)
Age 18-35 -0.004 (0.006) -0.003 (0.006) -0.004 (0.006)
Age 36-55 -0.008** (0.004) -0.007* (0.004) -0.008** (0.004)
No. of residents -0.008*** (0.002) -0.008*** (0.002) -0.007** (0.003)
No of residents2 0.001** (2.29E-4) 0.001** (5.74E-4) 0.001** (2.41E-4)
No. of bedrooms -0.008*** (0.002) -0.007*** (0.002) -0.006** (0.002)
College educated 0.006* (0.003) 0.007** (0.003) 0.008** (0.003)
Floor area sqft 1.42E-6* (7.64E-7) 1.35E-6 (7.95E-7)
Missing floor 0.011*** (0.004) 0.010*** (0.004)
No. of appliances -0.003*** (0.001)
No. of electronics -1.35E-03 (0.001)
Electric space heating -0.011* (0.006)
Constant 0.043*** (0.008) 0.031*** (0.009) 0.040*** (0.009)
Observations 2748 2748 2748
R2 0.079 0.82 0.087
Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01 Note: Variables for appliances
and electronics are top coded.
Table 3.3: Effects of Household and Structural Characteristics of the Home on Peak
Effects
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3.6.2 Heterogeneous Peak Effects
I report the results from Equation 3.5 in Table 3.3 for peak effects. The
dependent variable is the effect of the TOU treatment on the peak period; therefore
a negative coefficient should be interpreted to increase the effect on peak usage
whereas a positive coefficient will reduce the effect on peak usage. Columns 1
and 2 include independent variables for respondent and family characteristics and
structural characteristics of the house. Being a homeowner does not impact peak
effect, suggesting that, all else the same, there are no differences between renters and
homeowners on peak usage. However, having a detached home does result in higher
reductions in peak consumption. These households may have more autonomy over
the electricity usage in their homes. Contrary to expectation, respondents who are
college educated reduce peak usage less than households without a college education.
Respondents aged 36-55 have a larger reduction than those above 56. Having more
residents in a household increases the peak effect but at a decreasing rate. As
expected, being in a treatment group results in larger reductions during the peak
period compared to households in the control group.
Table 3.3 Column 1 omits the FloorSqft and MissingSqft variables as 58.19
percent of respondents did not know or did not wish to report the size of their
homes. It is also possible that misreporting errors were present with the 42 percent
who were able to answer the question. However, including the two variables shows
robustness in the estimates in Column 2. The coefficient FloorSqft indicates the
larger homes have lower peak effects, although weakly significant at the 10 percent
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level.
Finally, estimates in Table 3.3 Column 3 reveal significant impact of having
more appliances results in a larger peak effect, but having more electronics do not.
Households that rely mainly on electricity for space heating are capable of a larger
impact on peak usage. Higher peak pricing may encourage households to increase
their heating during periods prior to and after the peak period while reducing heat-
ing during the peak period.
3.6.3 Results for Fixed Effects Quantile and Conditional Average
Treatment Analysis
I graph the coefficients on the treatment variable for the septiles from fixed
effects quantile regression as described in Equation 3.7. Figure 3.3(a) shows a de-
creasing trend with the lowest 25 percentile of households exhibiting the smallest
and statistically insignificant effects. Households in the top 12.5 percentile exhibit
the highest effects.
Alternatively, I present estimates for the conditional average treatment effects
for the septiles of 2009 baseline usage in Figure 3.3(b). The results are broadly
consistent with those of the FE quantile estimates reflecting a downward trend in
effects. The highest septiles, bottom 12.5 percentile of users exhibit a statistically
significant average increase of 5.23 percent whereas the second to fourth septiles
exhibit no significant effects. The top 12.5 percentile of users exhibit the highest
negative effects of 5.82 percent.
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(a) FE Quantile ATEs on Septiles of 2009 Usage
(b) ATEs Conditional on Septiles of 2009 Usage
(c) ATEs Conditional on Septiles of 2009 Usage for College Educated
Respondents
Figure 3.3: Fixed Effects Quantile Regression and Conditional ATEs
73
Control Treatment
2009 2010 % change 2009 2010 % change
August 321.95 314.4 -2.40% 338.47 323.82 -4.33%
e45.40 e44.33 -2.41% e47.72 e44.68 -6.37%
September 308.18 319.49 3.54% 327.1 330.77 1.12%
e43.45 e45.05 3.55% e46.12 e46.03 -0.20%
October 339.34 333.75 -1.67% 360.38 346.85 -3.75%
e47.85 e47.06 -1.68% e50.81 e48.19 -5.16%
November 378.08 353.67 -6.90% 400.13 364.96 -8.79%
e53.31 e49.87 -6.90 e56.42 e52.00 -7.83%
December 446.42 412.09 -8.33% 470.39 423.51 -9.97%
e62.95 e58.10 -8.35% e66.32 e60.29 -9.09%
Table 3.4: Average Monthly Usage (kWh) and Bill(e)
These effects are further emphasized for households whose respondent is col-
lege educated in Figure 3.3(c) where the first and seventh septiles exhibit larger
effects of 5.42 percent increase and 6.63 percent decrease, respectively. Unlike Fig-
ure 3.3(b), septiles in between do not exhibit any significant effects. More educated
households may be better at understanding prices and how their electricity con-
sumption patterns impact their overall bill. Users in the first septile or the bottom
users may be more efficient in reducing electricity during the peak period all the
while increasing their usage during off peak periods, resulting in higher increase in
usage than average effects of the full sample. These findings are consistent with Di
Cosmo et al. (2014) and Ito (2011).
I compute average monthly usage and bills for the treatment and control groups
and report them in Table 3.4. They refer to August through December with com-
plete pre and post trial data. For every month with the exception of September,
monthly usage and bill in 2010 declined for both Control and Treatment group.
September of 2010 saw an average increase in usage for both control and treatment
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groups from 2009. Despite this, there was an average decrease in the bill for the
treatment group compared to an increase in the bill for the control group from the
previous year. On average, households under TOU in the treatment group were able
to increase their overall monthly usage while decreasing their total bill. While a ma-
jority of households in the treatment and control groups received bi-monthly bills,
this comparison is not meant to analyze effect of billing frequency and information
on usage.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I analyze the effects of TOU pricing in a region that has never
experienced this type of pricing scheme before. Ireland is a temperate region with
mild winters and cool summers where temperatures during this study do not fall be-
low 22◦F or exceed 65◦F. In other countries where there is greater seasonal variation
and larger reliance on electric heating, heating and cooling may drive effects of TOU
pricing. I find evidence that TOU is still effective in a region where electricity is
not the main fuel used for heating and does not require air-conditioning for cooling.
The effect of peak period pricing, is however, modest. It is possible that TOU may
produce larger effects in areas that use air conditioning and electric space heating.
In the Irish Trial, households that were on TOU pricing reduce their consump-
tion by 2.66 to 3.73 percent for each hour during the peak period. Effects increase
by tariff group which face increasing differences between the peak and day prices.
Hourly estimates show evidence of load shifting from the peak and day periods to
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the beginning of the night period. I find no evidence of load shifting of usage from
the weekday to the weekend suggesting reductions in overall usage. Surprisingly,
results also show that the peak effects also occur on the weekend at lower magni-
tudes. In other words, households reduce their usage during weekday designated
peak hours, which carry over to the weekend suggesting evidence of changes and
formation of new habits. Weekend reductions may also be corresponding to periods
when household members are active at home. Overall, the effects are generally small
compared to CPP studies that have found reductions from events to range from 7
to 16.2 percent [51, 53, 78]. Real time pricing has been found to be more effective
for conservation measures than for load shifting [7].
I investigate the source of heterogeneity in the response to TOU pricing. I find
that the type of housing structure, size of the house, age and education of survey
respondent and total appliances in the home significantly impacts effects on peak
usage. These are opposite to the findings of Houde et al. (2011) and Davis (2011),
who do not find survey variables to be significant sources of heterogeneity.
Households that consume the lowest electricity in kWh are more likely to in-
crease their overall consumption whereas households on the higher end of consump-
tion have the largest reduction effects. In some circumstances, TOU pricing may be
beneficial to low users. It may allow for them increase their overall usage and level
of comfort without increasing their bill, particularly in households located in areas
with extreme temperatures. Being able to increase the comfort levels in their homes
can lower mortality rates particularly for children, the elderly, and poor [21,41,42].
When these patterns of response to TOU are observed, TOU is the most effective
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at smoothing peak demand when reductions for the high-end users are greater that
the increases from the low-end users.
Overall, TOU may also be more effective for reducing usage of the highest
users and useful for targeting purposes, as some households are more responsive to
TOU than others. However, caution is needed in interpreting these results as effects
TOU pricing on peak load are small and are reflective of single-family households
with educated heads of households of the working age. Results are not represen-
tative of the entire population since participation in the trial was voluntary and
participants were compensated if their bills under TOU pricing were higher than if
they were on a flat rate tariff. Feedback and energy efficiency policies may be com-
bined with TOU to encourage further adjustments to usage beyond altering energy
consumption habits. Additionally, reducing peak consumption has implications for
savings in greenhouse gas emissions.4 Further research requiring information on
plant generation will be necessary to address these concerns.
4However, if more efficient generators or cleaner fuels, such as natural gas and renewables, are
used to generate electricity to meet peak demand then programs that focus on shifting peak load
to other periods where electricity is generated with low cost but dirtier generators, such as coal
and fuel oil, may result in higher greenhouse gas emissions.
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Chapter 4: The Effects of TOU Pricing on CO2 Emissions and Gen-
eration
4.1 Introduction
The Republic of Ireland (IE) electricity market is the first of its kind in that
in 2007, the two separate markets serving IE and Northern Ireland (NI) were inte-
grated into a Single Electricity Market (SEM) for the island. The Commission for
Energy Regulation (CER) mandates the SEM require electricity generators to sell
electricity into a single spot market for the island in, “which all electricity gener-
ated on or imported onto the island of Ireland must be sold, and from which all
wholesale electricity for consumption on or export from the island of Ireland must
be purchased.” The SEM is operated by the Single Electricity Market Operator
(SEMO) and is responsible for paying generators for their electricity produced and
invoicing suppliers for electricity purchased. Requiring all trading to occur in the
SEM allows for more price and market outcome transparency, which are often ob-
scured in European bilateral markets [20]. The SEMO market is a relatively isolated
system with imported electricity treated as generation units that must be placed as
a bid into the market. As a result, all electricity imported and exported to and from
the island can be closely tracked.
The previous chapters emphasized the importance of curtailing peak load on
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emissions savings and reducing the need to increase capacity of generation to meet
peak demand. In this chapter, I look at the make up of the island system to look
at the implications of an island wide implementation of a residential TOU pricing
policy. I estimate and compare the cost of generation and CO2 emissions for four
select weekdays in 2011 representing each of the four seasons. By using the generator
technical parameters, heat rate requirements, and commercial offer data, I am able
to build the merit curve for the sample days. I repeat this procedure on the adjusted
load to simulate the loads under TOU pricing and compare with the actual load.
Simulation variable pricing studies have found that, in the short run, time-
varying the price of electricity as it is generated results in average load increases, a
decrease in profits for all generating sectors, an increase in consumer surplus, modest
efficiency gains, and a decrease in CO2 emissions [45]. Yet in the long run, efficiency
gains usage are concomitant even with inelastic demand [13]. When examining
short run, simulation studies, others have found that the distributions of electricity
loads and prices becomes compressed, and as all rates decrease, the average loads
increase. This implies decreases in profits for all generating sectors, consumers
surplus increases for all consumers, modest efficiency gains, and the increase of SO
and NO emissions and decrease CO2 emissions [45].
Fuel mixes used to meet load generation demand may have implications on
the impact of time varying pricing aimed to reduce within day variation. In Hol-
land and Mansur (2008), regions where oil is predominantly used in the generation
of electricity to meet peak demand have larger decreases in emissions than regions
where peak demand is met by hydropower. Their findings further suggest that re-
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ducing peak demand in regions where more hydro is used to meet peak demand
would result in increases in emissions as demand is shifted to other periods in which
a dirtier generator is used to meet the demand. The SEMO consists of a similar
fuel mix of hydro, oil, and gas used to meet peak demand suggesting that a policy
that reduces within day variation of load may have positive or negative impacts on
emissions.
4.2 Background
The objective of the SEM is to provide the least cost source of electricity
generation at any point in time across the country by accessing the more efficient
generators to meet demand [20]. This is important as more expensive and/or less
efficient generators are used, too, during periods of high demand. Fossil fuels account
for 80 percent of the islands electricity generation where the base load generation
is powered by coal and peat1, mid-merit generation met by natural gas combined
cycle generation units, and peaking power generation is powered by oil and natural
gas [17, 20]. Despite the remaining 20 percent of electricity generation powered by
renewable energy from wind, bioenergy, and hydro [17], fossil fuels used in electricity
generation is the second largest contributor of greenhouse gas emissions in Ireland,
totaling 21.9 percent of national emissions [29].
In addition generators on the Island of Ireland, the Moyle Interconnector im-
1Peat generators are the dirtiest and most expensive to operate of the fuels. However, peat is
subsidized in order to provide employment in the Midlands region of the Republic of Ireland and
continues to be a topic of debate amongst politicians and economists [74].
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ports and exports electricity to and from Northern Ireland and Scotland. It has a
capacity to import and export up to 500MW of electricity between Northern Ireland
and Scotland. Between 2008 and 2011, electricity was mainly imported from Scot-
land. In mid-September 2011, the Moyle interconnector went out of service until
February of 2012. The East West Interconnector is the other importation source of
electricity to Ireland from Great Britain. It did not go online until September 2012.
According to the 2011 Republic of Ireland Census [1], these interconnectors de-
liver electricity to approximately 1,654,208 private residential households within the
Republic of Ireland. And between 2008 and 2011, residential electricity consump-
tion consists on average of 33 percent of the overall share of electricity consumed
in Ireland [72]. The large portion of electricity consumed by these residences has
significant implications as they relate to curtailing electricity demand and increasing
efficiency gains in generation.
Interconnector units are scheduled and fixed a day ahead of the next scheduled
run. In the SEM, wholesale prices are determined for every half hour. Generation
plants bid in the day ahead market and generate electricity in the order ranked from
lowest to highest by their bids until demand is met [25].
4.2.1 SEMO Merit Curve and Electricity Generation
Generator production and start up cost information submitted for each active
generator on the island to the SEMO are used to calculate half hourly and total
production costs. Plants (including available capacity submitted by the Moyle In-
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Source: UK Department of Energy and Climate Change
Figure 4.1: Weekday and Weekend Hourly Usage Comparison for the Treatment
Group
terconnector generator units) are allowed to submit up to 10 price and quantity
pairs that define the cost of generation by increments and a no load cost.2 These
costs are associated with the generator heat rate curve.
The merit curve is created for each half hour of the day ranking priority dis-
patch generators, such as predicted wind generation and peat generators, followed by
price making generators by least cost while taking into account their fixed technical
parameters. Fixed technical parameters for each generation unit include minimum
stable capacity and maximum stable capacity, minimum up and down time, and
start up temperature (See Tables B.1 and B.2 in Appendix B). These parameters
also play a role in determining generation unit position in the merit curve. For
example, a condensing steam cycle generator (CSCG) uses fossil fuels to boil water
to generate steam to run the turbine. They require the most energy to start up and
2Cost of generation varies by type of generator and price of fuel. A no load cost is the cost to
run the generator per hour at 0 electricity output.
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have the highest minimum on time requiring the unit to run for a fixed time before
it can be powered down. These generators make up the baseload as long as coal is
cheaper than natural gas (see Figure 4.1).
Combined cycle gas turbines (CCGTs) can be ramped up faster and require
less energy to start up than CSCGs. These units make up the bulk of the mid-merit
generators. Open cycle generators that use natural gas and distillate oil make up
the peaking units as they have the lowest minimum on times and can be rapidly
ramped up and down to meet peak demand. Hydro generator units have moderate
ramp up and down rates and no minimum on times making them flexible generators
for meeting base, mid-merit, and peak demand.
In addition to providing the SEMO with unit generation cost, plants had to
also provide information on incremental heat rate slopes, no load heat rate, and
generation increments. These variables are used to create the heat rate curve to
determine the amount of energy required by each generator to produce a MW of
electricity.
4.3 Data
As of 2011, the Island had a total of 73 grid-connected predictable generator
units3, 53 thermal and 15 hydro generators. Table 4.1 breaks down the fuel used
for generation, unit type, and installed capacity for Ireland and Northern Ireland.
Natural gas fueled generators have the largest capacity followed by coal. Distillate
3Wind generation is considered to be variable generation and is not counted as a predictable
generator unit.
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Fuel for generation Unit Type IE installed NI installed % of total
capacity (MW) capacity (MW) capacity
Peat or peat/biomass Baseload 345.6 - 3.99%
Coal Baseload 840 476 15.20%
Natural gas Baseload/mid-merit 3415.5 1,536 57.17%
Hydro/ pumped storage Peaking/mid-merit 508 - 5.87%
Distillate Peaking 424 315.2 8.54%
Oil Peaking 800 - 9.24%
Table 4.1: Installed island system generation capacity by fuel
and oil make up the next largest thermal capacity.
Half hourly load data by generator unit is collected from the SEMO for January
12, April 13, July 13, and October 12, 2011. These days, shown in Figures 4.3(a)-
4.3(d), represent a weekday for each season of the year to illustrate the difference
in the shape of the daily load curve and fuel mix. Figures 4.2(a)-4.2(d) provide
comparisons for the daily load and fuel mix averaged by month. In 2011, generation
load is highest during the fall and winter months. Generators fueled by distillate oil
are mainly used in the winter, spring, and fall months when peak demand days are
more prominent. Generators fueled by heavy fuel oil are the dirtiest emitters of CO2
and are used to meet peak demand on rare occasions. Initial analysis shows fuel oil
is occasionally used as a peaking plant on the highest load days in January and is
more often used as startup fuel. Figure 4.2(c) shows a decrease in the proportion
of coal-generated electricity in July away from coal as demand is reduced. During
months of lower demand, generation is met with primarily baseload and mid-merit
generators. On this day, available gas generators were cheaper to run than coal
generators.
The half hourly load data is used to calculate the CO2 emissions produced
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(a) January Daily Load (b) April Daily Load
(c) July Daily Load (d) October Daily Load
Figure 4.2: Average daily load duration curves and fuel mix for select months in
2011
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(a) January 12, 2011 (b) April 13, 2011
(c) July 13, 2011 (d) October 12, 2011
Figure 4.3: Daily load duration curves and fuel mix for select days in 2011
in electricity generation. The methodology used is similar to that of Wheatley
(2013) and Di Cosmo and Valeri (2016). I use individual plant information on load,
incremental heat rates, and no load heat requirements to calculate a heat rate curve
that determines the heat energy required to meet individual generator loads (from
Allislandproject.com). The heat energy is converted to carbon dioxide emissions
using energy factor conversions from the SEIA Annual Energy in Ireland report (see
Table B.1 in Appendix B) [48].
The load data is also used with commercial offer data submitted by the plants
for each generator unit for the SEMO to calculate generation costs. commercial
offer data depends on the price of fuel, technical limitations of generation units,
scheduled maintenance, etc. Since the data is in half hour increments, converting
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from MW to MWh requires the daily production cost to be divided by two. The no
load cost, price and quantity pairs and maximum load were used to calculate the
hourly operating rate less the start up costs to determine the merit curve. I use the
following equation to calculate the daily production cost for each generator unit:





NoLoadih + (P1× 1st Increment)ih + ...+ (Pn ×N th Increment)ih
(4.1)
where the first increment is the measure between 0 and Quantity 1 (from the first
price quantity pair), the second increment is the measure between Quantity 1 and
Quantity 2 (from the second price quantity pair) less the first increment. For exam-
ple, on January 12, 2011, the Aghada Combined Cycle Gas Turbine coste35.62/MW
for the first increment between 0-213MW, e45.08/MW for the increment between
213-430MW, e46.43/MW for the last increment between 430-448MW, and a no
load cost of e4712.21/hour. Generating a load of 435MW of electricity for 1 hour
would cost e22313.78 (e51.30/MWh) minus the startup cost.
4.4 Method
I simulate daily load under time of use response based off the average treatment
effects estimated in Chapter 3 Figure 3.2(a) to calculate the percentage change
in half hourly load, generation cost, and CO2 emissions. In 2011, 33 percent of
electricity consumed in the Republic of Ireland went to residential households. This
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statistic assumed to be islandwide implies an average 1 percent reduction to peak
load, 0.30 percent reduction to day load, and a 0.35 percent increase in night time
load.
Additionally, load shifting in response to the TOU pricing simulation is con-
strained within other times of the day and is not transferrable to other days. Wind
and peat generators are scheduled first followed by the least cost generator units
while taking into consideration startup costs, minimum stable capacity, and incre-
mental costs. After calculating the MW reduction (increase) for each half hourly
load resulting from a TOU scenario, I apply the reduction (increase) to the hourly
merit curve. Load generation is reduced (increased) from the generating unit with
the highest (lowest) incremental price. The least cost generator, usually a hydro
unit or high efficiency gas generator but can also be a coal unit, is updated in the
schedule to meet the increased load.
Startup cost and startup emissions were determined based on the number of
hours the generators are off after the previous scheduled runtime. The hours off
determine whether the generators start off cold, warm, or hot and are associated
with different costs, a cold start being the most costly as it requires more energy to
start.
4.5 Results and Discussion
Table 4.2 reports results for generation costs and emissions from generation.
System generation load was highest in October due to the Moyle Interconnector
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January 12, 2011 Actual Load TOU Load Savings
Total Load (MWh) 111,593.48 111,373.45 220.03
System Generation Load (MWh) 89,028.77 88,808.74 220.03
Generation cost (e) 4,372,533.34 4,357,172.64 15,380.70
Startup Cost (e) 175,572.11 175,572.11 -
CO2 Emission from Generation (metric Tonnes) 45,200.89 44,961.73 239.15
CO2 Emission from Startup (metric Tonnes) 574.14 574.14 -
CO2 Emission from MWh (metric Tonnes/MWh) 0.51 0.51 1.09
April 13, 2011 Actual Load TOU Load Savings
Total Load (MWh) 94,502.02 94,309.54 192.48
System Generation Load (MWh) 73,061.55 72,869.07 192.48
Generation cost (e) 3,601,869.83 3,589,091.68 192.48
Startup Cost (e) 357,197.63 357,197.63 -
CO2 Emission from Generation (metric Tonnes) 39047.01 38893.87 153.14
CO2 Emission from Startup (metric Tonnes) 1,464.52 1,464.52 -
CO2 Emission from MWh (metric Tonnes/MWh) 0.55 0.55 0.80
July 13, 2011 Actual Load TOU Load Savings
Total Load (MWh) 85,438.06 85,246.66 191.40
System Generation Load (MWh) 79,493.55 79,297.17 196.38
Generation cost (e) 3,587,483.67 3,577,943.98 9,548.69
Startup Cost (e) 24,168.60 24,168.60 -
CO2 Emission from Generation (metric Tonnes) 36,145.60 35,989.31 156.29
CO2 Emission from Startup (metric Tonnes) 94.51 94.51 -
CO2 Emission from MWh (metric Tonnes/MWh) 0.46 0.46 0.80
October 12, 2011 Actual Load TOU Load Savings
Total Load (MWh) 98,614.94 98,383.8 231.77
System Generation Load (MWh) 89,606.92 89,375.15 231.77
Generation cost (e) 4,100,552.49 4,087,233.29 13,319.19
Startup Cost (e) 274,360.80 274,305.82 54.98
CO2 Emission from Generation (metric Tonnes) 47,542.52 47,322.50 220.02
CO2 Emission from Startup (metric Tonnes) 588.30 587.72 0.59
CO2 Emission from MWh (metric Tonnes/MWh) 0.54 0.54 0.95
Table 4.2: Daily load, generation costs, and CO2 emissions under actual load and
time-of-use load
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being out of service. January represents the winter months with the highest total
load and July represents the summer months with the lowest total load.
The variable of interest is the ratio of CO2 emissions reduced per MWh saved.
Savings on January 12th were 1.09 metric tonnes of CO2 reduced per MWh saved.
These results suggest that time of use pricing is most effective during winter months
when baseload, mid-merit, and interconnector generation units are operating at
maximum capacity. This demonstrates that reducing load from dirtier and more
expensive peak units will result in larger emissions savings.
April 13 represents a weekday in the spring. Of the four samples, April 13 has
the highest startup costs because mid-merit generators are scheduled to ramp up
during the day to meet demand. A larger proportion of generation for coal units
indicates that natural gas generation may be costlier on this day. Peak generation is
mainly met with hydro and distillate generators, however, TOU simulation results
indicate that the more expensive natural gas generation is reduced during peak hours
resulting in lower emissions savings than if distillate generation were displaced.
Average weekdays in the summer, represented by July 13th, have the lowest
overall load and within day variation compared to other seasons. On days with low
within day variation, fewer generators are required to ramp up and down resulting
in lower startup costs and emissions. Figure 4.2(c) shows low wind generation
compared to other months and natural gas generators are scheduled to meet the
majority of the load. Simulated TOU peak and day reductions mainly impact coal
and less efficient gas generation whereas increased usage during the night can be
met by available Moyle units.
90
Figures 4.3(b) and 4.3(d) suggest weekdays during fall and spring months have
similar load shapes but fall months with a more defined peak period met with gas
and distillate units. October 12 shows an example of a day when interconnectors are
offline and replaced by a mix of gas and coal fired units. These units are generally
more expensive to operate and are dirtier emitted due to lower efficiency and type
of fuel. As a result, CO2 emissions per MWh generated may be higher than that of
months when the interconnector is on. Unsurprisingly, 0.95 metric tonnes of CO2
emissions per MWh saved is the second highest of the four days, suggesting TOU
pricing is more efficient in reducing CO2 emissions during the fall than in the spring
and summer months.
Of the four days, there was one instance in the TOU simulation where the peak
reductions allowed for a scheduled peaking generator to remain offline, resulting in
start up and generation savings on this particular day. This suggests the potential
for efficiency gains even with a TOU scheme with low estimated effects.
In the SEMO, the Moyle Interconnector is treated as a price-making unit and
is subject to submitting daily bids in the market. The interconnector unit offers
are relatively low cost (e20-30 per MW) and compete with cheaper gas and coal
generation units on the merit curve to meet mid-merit generation needs. During
the summer months when interconnection is not importing at maximum capacity,
load shifting can displace gas and coal units with interconnector and hydro units.
With the interconnector down in the fall of 2011, emission and cost of generation is
expected to increase, as the island is required to ramp up more expensive generation
units to meet the gap in demand.
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4.6 Conclusion
Despite criticism of a low response to time of use pricing in the literature, I
find evidence that suggests that even small reductions in peak and daily demand
result in emissions and generation cost savings. TOU pricing appears to be the most
effective in the winter and fall months when a larger proportion of peak demand
is met with distillate and oil generation units. This policy is less effective over
spring and summer months when the daily load is relatively flat without defined
peak periods. The unique temperate region of Ireland makes this an interesting test
case as we can see from the relatively flat daily loads shapes in the summer months.
TOU pricing would have larger impacts if this particular fuel mix were located in
regions with more variability in climate called for air conditioning. During these
times, reducing daily load would result in lower emissions savings per kWh reduced.
Often times, load shifting to the night time can be met with cleaner generation units
from hydro and high efficiency gas units.
Still, the results in this chapter should be considered as optimistic as residen-
tial electricity consumption accounts for 30 percent of overall consumption in the
Republic of Ireland. The Republic of Ireland consumes approximately 75 percent
of electricity on the island. The TOU results imposed from the previous chapter
assumes that The results in this chapter have significant policy implications for the
future as demand for electricity continues to grow. Since 2011, installed wind capac-
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ity in the Republic of Ireland alone has almost doubled from 1631MW to 3015MW.4
Coal and peat, the dirtiest of the fuels, continue to dominate a significant portion
of the fuel mix in the generation market. As Ireland moves away from fossil fuel
intensive generation and imported electricity, wind is expected to continue to fill in
the gaps and phase out distillate and heavy fuel oil generation, emissions reductions
will be determined primarily by natural gas and coal generators. Real time pricing
may be a better policy alternative as it has been found to result in larger demand
response than TOU pricing [13,45].
4Installed wind capacity of 3015 MW in the Republic of Ireland is a 2015 figure from the Irish
Wind Energy Association.
93
Appendix A: Appendix A
Figure A.1 shows the in-home display monitor provided through ESB Net-
works. The display home screen shows the following information:
1. Shows how household is doing compared to their pre-set daily budget,
2. Current price of electricity,
3. Cost of electricity has accumulated for the current month,
4. Price for each kWh of electricity at the peak, day, and night periods.
Figure A.1: In-home display monitor
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BM M IHD Total
Did not receive payment 448 467 492 1,407
56.28% 57.73% 61.42% 58.48%
Received payment 348 342 309 999
43.72% 42.47% 38.58% 41.52%
Total 769 809 801 2,406
Note: Received payment means there was a positive balance of
the trial, which was paid out to trial participants (See page 16).
Table A.1: Balancing credit payment: Percentage receiving pay-
ment by information treatment group
Mean Mean* S.D. Min. Max.
BM 5.62 12.86 11.65 0 91.96
M 5.78 13.68 11.84 0 93.85
IHD 4.97 12.89 11.64 0 105.25
Note: Mean, S.D, Min., and Max. are descrip-
tive statistics that include every household in
the treatment group. Mean* is the average for
those households who participated in the trial
and received a payment at the end of it.
Table A.2: Summary of balancing credit pay-
ment (e): payment received by information
treatment group
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Table B.1: Fuel and CO2 conversion factors
96












AD1 Aghada	Unit	1 IE CSC Gas Gas 35.0 258.0 188.15 35 120 190 258 8.03 8.03 8.70 8.77
ADC Aghada	CCGT IE CCGT Gas Gas 215.0 431.6 354.51 215 432 - - 5.50 5.50 - -
AT4 Aghada	CT	Unit	4 IE OCGT Gas Gas 15.0 90.0 285.30 15 40 90 - 7.83 7.83 9.72 -
DB1 Dublin	Bay	Power IE CCGT Gas Gas 207.0 415.0 479.34 207 415 - - 5.16 5.16 - -
HN2 Huntstown	Phase	II IE CCGT Gas Gas 194.0 404.0 603.60 195 230 412 - 4.24 5.62 5.74 -
HNC Huntstown IE CCGT Gas Gas 200.0 343.0 541.20 200 230 250 352 4.46 5.19 5.99 6.01
MRC	No	ST Marina	No	ST IE OCGT Gas Gas 20.0 85.0 257.13 47 81 85 - 8.66 9.48 11.41 -
PBC Poolbeg	Combined	Cycle IE CCGT Gas Gas 232.0 480.0 426.19 232 480 - - 6.26 6.26 - -
SK3 Sealrock	3 IE OCGT Gas Gas 40.0 83.0 100.00 40 83 - - 5.00 5.00 - -
SK4 Sealrock	4 IE OCGT Gas Gas 40.0 83.0 100.00 40 83 - - 5.00 5.00 - -
TY Tynagh IE CCGT Gas Gas 196.0 388.5 584.00 196 388 - - 5.09 5.09 - -
WG Whitegate IE CCGT Gas Gas 222.5 445.0 680.00 223 224 445 - 4.72 4.72 4.98 -
GI1 Great	Island	Unit	1 IE CSC 61%	Oil,	39%	Distillate Oil 25.0 54.0 51.07 25 45 54 - 13.59 13.59 13.67 -
GI2 Great	Island	Unit	2 IE CSC 61%	Oil,	39%	Distillate Oil 25.0 49.0 51.07 25 45 49 - 13.59 13.59 13.67 -
GI3 Great	Island	Unit	3 IE CSC 61%	Oil,	39%	Distillate Oil 30.0 109.0 102.65 30 98 109 - 10.88 10.88 10.98 -
TB1 Tarbert	Unit	1 IE CSC 61%	Oil,	39%	Distillate Oil 20.0 54.0 44.66 18 46 54 - 11.63 11.63 11.75 -
TB2 Tarbert	Unit	2 IE CSC 61%	Oil,	39%	Distillate Oil 20.0 54.0 44.66 18 46 54 - 11.63 11.63 11.75 -
TB3 Tarbert	Unit	3 IE CSC 70%	Oil,	30%	Distillate Oil 34.9 240.0 247.61 35 100 180 240 8.07 8.07 9.06 9.15
TB4 Tarbert	Unit	4 IE CSC 70%	Oil,	30%	Distillate Oil 34.9 240.0 247.62 35 120 190 241 8.40 8.40 9.43 9.64
MP1 Moneypoint	Unit	1 IE CSC 68%	Coal,	32%	GasOil Coal 136.0 280.0 173.41 128 195 280 - 9.46 9.46 9.56 -
MP2 Moneypoint	Unit	2 IE CSC 68%	Coal,	32%	GasOil Coal 136.0 280.0 173.41 128 195 280 - 9.46 9.46 9.56 -
MP3 Moneypoint	Unit	3 IE CSC 68%	Coal,	32%	GasOil Coal 136.0 280.0 173.41 128 195 280 - 9.46 9.46 9.56 -
ED1 Edenderry IE CSC Oil Peat/Biomass 41.0 117.6 497.60 88 112 118 - 3.93 8.95 8.95 -
LR4 Lough	Rea IE CSC Peat Peat 73.0 91.0 84.10 73 91 - - 8.53 8.53 - -
WO4 West	Offaly	Power IE CSC Peat Peat 106.2 137.0 114.71 106 137 - - 8.24 8.24 - -
AA1 Ardnacrusha	Unit	1 IE Hydro Hydro 11.9 21.0 - - - - - - - - -
AA2 Ardnacrusha	Unit	2 IE Hydro Hydro 11.9 22.0 - - - - - - - - -
AA3 Ardnacrusha	Unit	3 IE Hydro Hydro 11.9 19.0 - - - - - - - - -
AA4 Ardnacrusha	Unit	4 IE Hydro Hydro 11.9 24.0 - - - - - - - - -
ER1 Erne	Unit	1 IE Hydro Hydro 4.0 10.0 - - - - - - - - -
ER2 Erne	Unit	2 IE Hydro Hydro 4.0 10.0 - - - - - - - - -
ER3 Erne	Unit	3 IE Hydro Hydro 5.0 22.5 - - - - - - - - -
ER4 Erne	Unit	4 IE Hydro Hydro 5.0 22.5 - - - - - - - - -
LE1 Lee	Unit	1 IE Hydro Hydro 3.0 15.0 - - - - - - - - -
LE2 Lee	Unit	2 IE Hydro Hydro 1.0 4.0 - - - - - - - - -
LE3 Lee	Unit	3 IE Hydro Hydro 3.0 8.0 - - - - - - - - -
LI1 Liffey	Unit	1 IE Hydro Hydro 3.0 15.0 - - - - - - - - -
LI2 Liffey	Unit	2 IE Hydro Hydro 3.0 15.0 - - - - - - - - -
LI4 Liffey	Unit	4 IE Hydro Hydro 4.0 4.0 - - - - - - - - -
LI5 Liffey	Unit	5 IE Hydro Hydro 0.2 4.0 - - - - - - - - -
TH1 Turlough	Hill	Unit	1 IE Pumped	Storage Pumped	Storage 5.0 73.0 0.00 - - - - - - - -
TH2 Turlough	Hill	Unit	2 IE Pumped	Storage Pumped	Storage 5.0 73.0 0.00 - - - - - - - -
TH3 Turlough	Hill	Unit	3 IE Pumped	Storage Pumped	Storage 5.0 73.0 0.00 - - - - - - - -
TH4 Turlough	Hill	Unit	4 IE Pumped	Storage Pumped	Storage 5.0 73.0 0.00 - - - - - - - -
AT1 Aghada	CT	Unit	1 IE OCGT Gas Gas 15.0 88.0 285.30 15 40 90 - 7.83 7.83 9.72 -
AT2 Aghada	CT	Unit	2 IE OCGT Gas Gas 15.0 90.0 285.30 15 40 90 - 7.83 7.83 9.72 -
ED3 Cushaling IE OCGT Distillate Distillate 5.0 56.0 85.00 56 - - - 9.00 - - -
ED5 Cushaling IE OCGT Distillate Distillate 5.0 56.0 85.00 56 - - - 9.00 - - -
NW5 Northwall	Unit	5 IE OCGT Distillate Distillate 5.0 104.0 310.93 5 104 - - 9.76 9.76 - -
RH1 Rhode	1 IE OCGT Distillate Distillate 5.0 52.0 85.01 5 52 - - 9.82 9.82 - -
RH2 Rhode	2 IE OCGT Distillate Distillate 5.0 52.0 85.01 5 52 - - 9.82 9.82 - -
TP1 Tawnaghmore	1 IE OCGT Distillate Distillate 5.0 52.0 86.62 5 52 - - 9.59 9.59 - -
TP3 Tawnaghmore	3 IE OCGT Distillate Distillate 5.0 52.0 86.62 5 52 - - 9.59 9.59 - -
B10 Ballylumford	Unit	10 NI CCGT Gas Gas 63.0 101.0 88.34 63 101 - - 6.00 6.00 - -
B31 Ballylumford	CCGT	Unit	31 NI CCGT Gas Gas 113.0 247.0 280.80 113 247 - - 5.94 5.94 - -
B32 Ballylumford	Unit	32 NI CCGT Gas Gas 113.0 247.0 280.80 113 247 - - 5.94 5.94 - -
B4 Ballylumford	Unit	4 NI CSC Gas Gas 54.0 170.0 166.50 54 170 - - 9.72 9.72 - -
B5 Ballylumford	Unit	5 NI CSC Gas Gas 54.0 170.0 166.50 54 170 - - 10.20 10.20 - -
B6 Ballylumford	Unit	6 NI CSC Gas Gas 54.0 170.0 166.50 54 170 - - 10.00 10.00 - -
Contour	1 Contour	Global	unit	1 NI CHP Gas Gas 1.5 3.0 2.45 3 - - - 7.35 - - -
Contour	2 Contour	Global	unit	2 NI CHP Gas Gas 1.5 3.0 2.54 3 - - - 7.35 - - -
CPS	CCGT Coolkeeragh	CCGT NI CCGT Gas Gas 260.0 425.0 624.51 260 328 372 425 4.32 5.26 5.49 5.52
K1	Coal	220 Kilroot	Unit	1	FGD NI CSC Oil Coal 54.0 238.0 272.45 54 175 198 238 8.87 8.87 8.87 28.26
K2	Coal	220 Kilroot	Unit	2	FGD NI CSC Oil Coal 54.0 238.0 272.45 54 175 198 238 8.87 8.87 8.87 28.26
BGT1 Ballylumford	GT1 NI OCGT Distillate Distillate 8.0 58.0 171.00 8 53 58 - 10.50 10.50 10.50 -
BGT2 Ballylumford	GT2 NI OCGT Distillate Distillate 8.0 58.0 171.00 8 53 58 - 10.50 10.50 10.50 -
CGT8 Coolkeeragh	GT8 NI OCGT Distillate Distillate 8.0 58.0 171.00 8 58 - - 10.50 10.50 - -
KGT1 Kilroot	GT1 NI OCGT Distillate Distillate 5.4 29.0 97.38 5 24 29 - 10.50 10.50 10.50 -
KGT2 Kilroot	GT2 NI OCGT Distillate Distillate 5.4 29.0 97.38 5 24 29 - 10.50 10.50 10.50 -
KGT3 Kilroot	GT3 NI OCGT Distillate Distillate 12.8 41.6 115.39 13 42 - - 9.24 9.24 - -
KGT4 Kilroot	GT4 NI OCGT Distillate Distillate 12.8 41.6 115.39 13 42 - - 9.24 9.24 - -





Note: OCGT= open cycle gas turbine, CSC = condense steam cycle, CHP = combined heat and
power, Pumped Storage = pumped storage hydro. Source: Commission for Energy Regulation All
Island Project.
































AD1 Aghada	Unit	1 6.3% 50 3.4 3.7 4.00 3.50 4302 2185 1273 5 72
ADC Aghada	CCGT 2.9% 50 22.0 22.0 4.00 4.00 2400 1800 1200 12 72
AT4 Aghada	CT	Unit	4 4.8% 50 5.0 5.0 0.00 0.75 63 63 63 12 60
DB1 Dublin	Bay	Power 2.0% 24 10.0 9.0 4.00 0.00 7700 2604 2600 1 72
HN2 Huntstown	Phase	II 7.0% 55 20.0 20.0 4.00 4.00 644 531 318 12 60
HNC Huntstown 7.0% 55 7.0 7.0 4.00 4.00 4772 2803 835 12 60
MRC	No	ST Marina	No	ST 4.8% 50 5.0 5.0 1.00 0.50 63 63 63 12 120
PBC Poolbeg	Combined	Cycle 5.9% 50 16.5 16.5 4.00 4.00 2800 1800 1500 8 120
SK3 Sealrock	3	(Aughinish	CHP) 3.0% 33 6.0 6.0 4.00 4.00 1200 1000 800 8 24
SK4 Sealrock	4	(Aughinish	CHP) 3.0% 33 6.0 6.0 4.00 4.00 1200 1000 800 8 24
TY Tynagh 3.6% 55 15.0 15.0 4.00 4.00 4115 2954 1900 8 40
WG Whitegate 3.4% 32.14 30.0 30.0 4.00 4.00 333 310 277 12 72
GI1 Great	Island	Unit	1 0.2% 50 1.0 1.0 4.00 2.00 562 449 218 12 48
GI2 Great	Island	Unit	2 8.6% 50 1.0 1.0 4.00 2.00 562 449 218 12 48
GI3 Great	Island	Unit	3 1.7% 50 0.6 1.5 4.00 4.00 743 600 293 12 60
TB1 Tarbert	Unit	1 0.3% 50 1.0 1.0 2.00 2.00 562 449 218 12 60
TB2 Tarbert	Unit	2 1.1% 50 1.0 1.0 2.00 2.00 562 449 218 12 60
TB3 Tarbert	Unit	3 0.3% 50 2.8 2.2 24.00 4.00 3180 1934 1072 14 120
TB4 Tarbert	Unit	4 5.0% 50 2.8 2.2 24.00 4.00 3180 1934 1072 14 120
MP1 Moneypoint	Unit	1	FGD	SCR 6.3% 50 1.4 5.0 6.00 5.00 14620 6920 4360 12 72
MP2 Moneypoint	Unit	2	FGD	SCR 5.9% 50 1.4 5.0 6.00 5.00 14620 6920 4360 12 72
MP3 Moneypoint	Unit	3	FGD	SCR 6.1% 50 1.4 5.0 6.00 5.00 14620 6920 4360 12 72
ED1 Edenderry 4.0% 72 1.8 1.8 4.00 0.50 2308 1084 436 4 48
LR4 Lough	Rea 5.0% 50 1.5 1.5 4.00 4.00 500 400 300 12 60
WO4 West	Offaly	Power 7.1% 50 1.5 1.5 4.00 4.00 750 600 450 12 60
AA1 Ardnacrusha	Unit	1 2.4% 60 6.0 6.0 0.00 0.25 0 0 0 12 60
AA2 Ardnacrusha	Unit	2 2.4% 60 6.0 6.0 0.00 0.25 0 0 0 12 60
AA3 Ardnacrusha	Unit	3 2.4% 60 6.0 6.0 0.00 0.25 0 0 0 12 60
AA4 Ardnacrusha	Unit	4 2.3% 60 6.0 6.0 0.00 0.25 0 0 0 12 60
ER1 Erne	Unit	1 2.4% 60 5.0 10.0 0.00 0.17 0 0 0 12 60
ER2 Erne	Unit	2 2.4% 60 5.0 10.0 0.00 0.17 0 0 0 12 60
ER3 Erne	Unit	3 2.4% 60 10.0 22.5 0.00 0.17 0 0 0 12 60
ER4 Erne	Unit	4 0.9% 60 10.0 22.5 0.00 0.17 0 0 0 12 60
LE1 Lee	Unit	1 2.3% 60 2.4 15.0 0.00 0.17 0 0 0 12 60
LE2 Lee	Unit	2 2.3% 60 1.5 4.0 0.00 0.17 0 0 0 12 60
LE3 Lee	Unit	3 2.3% 60 0.6 8.0 0.00 0.17 0 0 0 12 60
LI1 Liffey	Unit	1 2.5% 60 5.0 10.0 0.00 0.20 0 0 0 12 60
LI2 Liffey	Unit	2 2.3% 60 5.0 10.0 0.00 0.20 0 0 0 12 60
LI4 Liffey	Unit	4 2.5% 60 2.0 2.0 0.25 0.13 0 0 0 12 60
LI5 Liffey	Unit	5 2.5% 60 0.0 2.0 0.00 0.12 0 0 0 12 60
TH1 Turlough	Hill	Unit	1 6.4% 60 210.0 270.0 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 12 60
TH2 Turlough	Hill	Unit	2 2.1% 60 210.0 270.0 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 12 60
TH3 Turlough	Hill	Unit	3 6.4% 60 210.0 270.0 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 12 60
TH4 Turlough	Hill	Unit	4 6.4% 60 210.0 270.0 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 12 60
AT1 Aghada	CT	Unit	1 4.9% 50 5.0 5.0 0.00 0.75 63 63 63 12 60
AT2 Aghada	CT	Unit	2 4.9% 50 5.0 5.0 0.00 0.75 63 63 63 12 60
ED3 Cushaling 2.0% 24 5.0 5.0 0.00 0.08 20 20 20 0.5 1
ED5 Cushaling 2.0% 24 5.0 5.0 0.00 0.08 20 20 20 0.5 1
NW5 Northwall	Unit	5 4.4% 50 8.0 8.0 0.00 0.50 50 50 50 12 60
RH1 Rhode	1 0.0% 50 5.0 10.0 0.00 0.75 24 24 24 12 60
RH2 Rhode	2 0.2% 50 5.0 10.0 0.00 0.75 24 24 24 12 60
TP1 Tawnaghmore	1 1.3% 50 5.0 10.0 0.00 0.75 24 24 24 12 60
TP3 Tawnaghmore	3 0.3% 50 5.0 10.0 0.00 0.75 24 24 24 12 60
B10 Ballylumford	Unit	10 5.0% 72 1.1 4.0 0.02 0.25 405 225 135 8 40
B31 Ballylumford	CCGT	Unit	31 4.0% 72 3.1 11.0 0.02 0.25 1611 666 567 8 40
B32 Ballylumford	Unit	32 4.0% 72 3.1 11.0 0.02 0.25 1611 666 567 8 40
B4 Ballylumford	Unit	4 8.0% 72 2.0 9.7 0.02 0.02 2070 1530 810 10 26
B5 Ballylumford	Unit	5 8.0% 72 2.0 9.8 0.02 0.02 2070 1530 810 10 26
B6 Ballylumford	Unit	6 8.0% 72 2.0 9.8 0.02 0.02 2070 1530 810 10 26
Contour	1 Contour	Global	unit	1 4.0% 60 0.8 0.8 0.17 0.25 - - - 0.25 0.25
Contour	2 Contour	Global	unit	2 4.0% 60 0.8 0.8 0.17 0.25 - - - 0.25 0.25
CPS	CCGT Coolkeeragh	CCGT 3.0% 72 8.0 18.5 4.00 4.00 5220 3024 1080 8 36
K1	Coal	220 Kilroot	Unit	1	FGD 3.2% 72 4.6 5.8 4.00 0.02 2152 1580 941 10 55
K2	Coal	220 Kilroot	Unit	2	FGD 3.2% 72 4.6 5.8 4.00 0.02 2152 1580 941 10 55
BGT1 Ballylumford	GT1 1.4% 72 10.0 18.0 0.02 0.25 8 8 8 n/a	=	OCGT 0
BGT2 Ballylumford	GT2 1.4% 72 10.0 18.0 0.02 0.25 8 8 8 n/a	=	OCGT 0
CGT8 Coolkeeragh	GT8 1.1% 72 10.0 10.0 0.02 0.25 8 8 8 n/a	=	OCGT 0
KGT1 Kilroot	GT1 0.8% 72 6.0 6.0 0.33 0.25 8 8 8 n/a	=	OCGT 0
KGT2 Kilroot	GT2 0.8% 72 6.0 6.0 0.33 0.25 8 8 8 n/a	=	OCGT 0
KGT3 Kilroot	GT3 2.0% 72 10.0 10.0 0.33 0.38 10 10 10 n/a	=	OCGT 0
KGT4 Kilroot	GT4 2.0% 72 10.0 10.0 0.33 0.38 10 10 10 n/a	=	OCGT 0
Contour	3 Contour	Global	unit	3 4.0% 60 0.8 0.8 0.17 0.25 - - - 0.25 0.25
Source: Commission for Energy Regulation All Island Project.
Figure B.2: Generation unit operation parameters
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